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1Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism inGovernment Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 637 (1996)(hereinafter Liability forSovereign Acts).  See also Joshua I. Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal ofCongruence in Government Contracts Law, 26 PUB. CON. L. J. 481, 489-492 (1997) (hereinafterAssembling Winstar); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the Sovereign Acts and UnmistakabilityDoctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1177, 1192-1193 & n. 61(2000) (hereinafter Wake of Winstar); Joshua I. Schwartz, Learning from the United States’Procurement Law Experience: On “Law Transfer” and Its Limitations, 11 PUB. PROC. L. REV.115, 117-118 (2002) (hereinafter Learning from the United States’ Procurement Experience.) . 
2Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1, at 490
3In my own work, at least, these constructs have not been deployed to gauge the degree towhich the public contracts law of the States of the United States depart from the norms of theirprivate contract law.  That undertaking is certainly worthwhile, however.  For readers without abackground in United States law, it is important to emphasize here that the body of publicprocurement law described in this Article as “United States Federal Public Procurement Law”
I. Introduction Over the course of the last decade the present author has consistently asserted that UnitedStates federal government procurement law may most usefully be understood by reference to aspectrum running between polar opposite approaches labeled  “exceptionalism” and“congruence.”  “Exceptionalism,” as I initially defined it, is the idea that “because of itssovereign status, unique functions, and special responsibilities, the United States Government asa contracting party is not subject to all of the legal obligations and liabilities of privatecontracting parties.”1  The opposing norm of “congruence” embodies “the tendency to construethe obligations and liabilities of the United States Government under its contracts to conform tothose of private parties under purely private agreements.”2  In short, this spectrum gauges thedegree to which aspects of federal public procurement law diverge from the rules of privatecontract law that govern comparable issues and does so in respects that favor the government ofthe United States.3 
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governs only the transactions entered into by the federal –that is the national– government of theUnited States.  Moreover, the States are essentially free to frame their own procurement lawsystems and they need not track a single model in doing so.  Thus, further research coulddemonstrate variation in the degree to which the States adhere to an exceptionalist orcongruence-oriented approach.  It may be particularly worthwhile to undertake the extension of these concepts torepresentative examples of state procurement law systems, precisely because the United StatesConstitution does not allow the States any significant military procurement role.  Accordingly,the absence of military procurement from the development of state procurement systems mighthave affected their approach to issues of exceptionalism and congruence in a manner that wouldshed further light on the thesis advanced in this Article.  As noted below, this but one of thesuggestions for further research that emerges from the present study.  See infra TAN ___.
4 This is the essential thesis of Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1. See especially,id. at 637-638, 650-651, 697-702.  Despite language in a plurality opinion in the Winstar case(518 U.S. 839 (1996)) that might be thought to side decisively with the norm of congruence, theauthor has argued in subsequent articles that neither the Supreme Court’s decision in that case (inwhich there was no majority opinion), nor subsequent developments in this field of law, have infact significantly alleviated this tension, nor even recognized the conflict in the existing law.Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1, passim; Schwartz, Wake of Winstar, supra note 1,passim
5Joshua I. Schwartz, CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A SURVEY OF GOVERNMENTPROCUREMENT LAW 43-45 (desktop published, Fall 2004 ed.) (hereinafter “PROCUREMENT LAWCASES AND MATERIALS”).
The author has argued, further, that the Supreme Court of the United States has neverrecognized, much less resolved, the tension between the exceptionalist and congruenceapproaches both found within the corpus of the United States federal government contract law.4 Nonetheless, from an analytical point of view, the contrast between these opposing tendenciesprovides a key organizing construct – indeed, I have suggested, perhaps, the central construct – for the study and understanding of United States government contracts law.5  In addition,although the exceptionalism/congruence spectrum initially was proposed as a device forunderstanding United States public procurement law in a purely domestic context, the utility of
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6 Learning from the United States’ Procurement Law Experience, supra note 1, at 117-118.
7 The law of government contract formation, in the United States, addresses the processesby which contracting opportunities are publicized, the criteria for contract award, processes forthe selection of the appropriate contractor, and the availability of “bid protest” litigation injudicial and administrative forums to challenge a governmental agency’s choice of contractor. The law of government contract performance, in the United States, governs problems that ariseduring the performance of the contract, including the resolution of disputes in administrative andjudicial forums.  The distinction between the law of government contract formation and the lawof government contract performance is the central organizing dichotomy that governs theteaching of federal government contracts law in the United States.
this construct in comparative law contexts has also been recognized.  The author has invoked thisconstruct as a tool for exploring the development of public procurement law in developingnations, and in addressing the problem of transferability of “best practices” for publicprocurement from developed nations to developing nations.6It is time to take a closer look at the phenomenon of exceptionalism that characterizes somuch of United States public procurement law.  The examination undertaken here has severalimportant dimensions.  The first element, is to delineate more precisely the incidence and scope of theexceptionalist tendency that I have identified in United States government contracts law.  Oncloser examination, it is discernible that this exceptionalist tendency is primarily, though notexclusively, manifested in doctrines concerning the performance, rather than the formation ofUnited States government contracts.7  There certainly are aspects of the law of public contractformation that might be labeled  “exceptionalist” in the sense that they represent departures fromthe norms of private contract law in the area of contract formation.  On examination, however,these, for the most part, are doctrines that impose additional obligations and duties on the
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8See infra TAN ___-___.
9  Previously, in a somewhat different, but still relevant context, the present author hasemployed this nomenclature of “exceptionalism” to describe both the reasoning behind and thepractical operation of the Supreme Court’s administrative law cases that immunize thegovernment from operation of the private law doctrine of equitable estoppel.  See Joshua I.Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for AnAgency's Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653, 664(1992) (hereinafter “The Irresistible Force”).  That earlier work identified as a central weaknessof this body of law the fact that the Court was attuned exclusively to the special obligations andresponsibilities of the government, and the special requirements of relevant Constitutional texts,that tended to justify shielding it from the duties and liabilities applicable to private parties,labeling this approach “negative exceptionalism.” Id. at 664-668.  At the same time, TheIrresistible Force argued, the Court was inappropriately oblivious to factors and doctrines –suchas the Due Process Clause of the Constitution--that might suggest that the United Statesgovernment enjoys special responsibilities toward those with whom it engages that are not sharedby private parties.  Id. at 726-742. The approach suggested by the latter branch of my argument inThe Irresistible Force promotes “positive exceptionalism” as that term is employed here.
government with respect to contract formation, obligations that are not shared by privatecontracting parties.  The paradigmatic example of such special obligations is the duty to securefull and open competition in awarding most government contracts and the proceduralrequirements that implement this overriding duty.8  By contrast, departures from the norms andrules of private contract law in the area of federal public contract performance law, generallyentail either 1) special immunities that reduce or eliminate the liability of the United States forconduct that might be deemed a breach of  contract were it committed by a party to a privatesector contract, or 2) powers allowed to the United States to alter its own contracts that wouldrender a private contract void on the ground that it is illusory or unsupported by consideration.  Itis this “negative” form of exceptionalism that reduces the government’s obligations or expandsits powers vis a vis contractors that more properly defines what the author has labeled theexceptionalist tendency in the United States public procurement law system.9  By contrast the
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 6reverse phenomenon, positive departures from the norms of private contract law that imposeextra obligations on the United States in contracting, especially in the public contract formationprocess, the author will label “reverse exceptionalsim.” In order to substantiate the present author’s first major hypothesis–  that this phenomenon defined here as “exceptionalism” is primarily associated with the United States’ lawof government contract performance – this Article presents a survey, identifying many of themost telling examples of exceptionalism in the operation of the United States’  publicprocurement law.  These examples cluster quite strikingly in the area of government contractperformance rules.  By contrast, our doctrinal survey will confirm that the law of governmentcontract formation also departs from the norms of the law of private contracts, for instance byrequiring full and open competition and specifying mandatory procedures to ensure achievementof that objective.  However, as suggested above, the survey also confirms that these departuresare primarily such as to impose additional duties and obligations on the government, rather thanto limit its liabilities or lend it atypical powers.  Thus United States law of public contractformation is typified by reverse exceptionalism, not by the exceptionalist tendency defined here.Careful study of the incidence of exceptionalism in the United States’ governmentprocurement law will assuredly sharpen our understanding of the nature and operation of theUnited States public procurement system viewed in a purely domestic law context. However,recognizing the performance law focus of  the exceptionalist aspects of United States governmentcontracts system becomes  particularly significant when that system is viewed in comparative lawperspective.  In contrast to the procurement law of the United States which addresses both issuesof contract formation and contract performance, the practice of European Community public
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10 There is some variation on this point among the European Community Member States,with Germany and the United Kingdom adhering to this pattern and with France most inclined tocreate exceptionalist government procurement law extending to the field of contractperformance. Wolfgang Kirchhoff, Frederick J. Lees, Daniel Mitterhoff, Joshua I. Schwartz,Nigel Shipman, REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLICOF CHINA, (International Republican Institute, May 2001), at 20;  Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli& Don Wallace, Jr., REGULATING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALPERSPECTIVES (Kluwer 2000), at 190, 192; Joshua Schwartz, supra note 5, at 479-480.
11 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 479-480. See Laurence Folliot-Lalliot, French PublicContracts, forthcoming ___West's International Government Contractor ___ (200x)  Part I,Chap. 2.  See also Jose Guilherme Giacomuzzi, Dissertation Proposal (Spring 2004), pp. 3-9,citing: René Chapus, Droit Administratif General vol. 1, § 724, 551 (15d ed., Montchrestien2001) (on French law);  José Cretella, Jr., Dos Contratos Administrativos 38 (Forense 2001) (onBrazilian law); Eduardo García de Enterría & Tomás-Ramón Fernández, Curso de DerechoAdministrativo vol. 1, 658-755 (9th ed., Civitas 1999) (on Spanish law); Massimo SeveroGiannini, Istituzioni di Diritto Amministrativo, 498-540 (2d ed., Giuffrè 2000) (on Italian law); Harmut Maurer, Droit Administraif Allemand, 359-400 (translator Michel Fromont, L.G.D.J.1994) (on German law).
procurement law as well at that of many of the major European nations is to treat rules ofcontract performance as lying outside the corpus of public contract law.  The theory appears to bethat the private contracts law of the individual Member States governs the performance andenforcement of public contracts once they are duly entered into.10  This, on its face, amounts to acommitment to an approach to government contracts performance law that we would labelcongruence-based.  To be sure,  in some national European and other civil law procurement law systems,rules of law concerning public contract performance that plainly are recognizable as“exceptionalist” have been established with respect to an ill-defined subset of public contractsdenominated as “administrative contracts.”11   And it would be idle to pretend that such rules arenot in practical effect an important part of the law of public contracts in the countries that employ
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 8the special category of  “administrative contracts.”  So exceptionalism regarding the rules ofcontract performance is not a complete stranger to public procurement law in Europe and othercivil law traditions.  Nonetheless, accurate and penetrating comparative law analysis in the fieldof public procurement law is significantly undermined by the fact that the threshold definition ofthe scope and coverage of public procurement law is different in the United States from thatemployed in much of  Europe and elsewhere.  Specifically, because the exceptionalist aspects of United States public procurement lawsystem are most strikingly evidenced in doctrines governing matters that Europeans and Civiliansoften portray as predominantly outside the scope of public procurement law, significantdifferences between European and United States public procurement law will be obscured unlessthe broadest view is taken of the field of public contract law.   Conversely, any meaningfulcomparative assessment must start with, and gauge accurately, the disparities between therespective approaches to defining the field of public contracts law rules.  It is suggested here –below – that the exceptionalism/congruence spectrum has the potential to be a particularly usefuldevice for comparative law studies of public procurement law, transcending some of theconventional difficulties associated with comparison in isolation of seemingly parallel portionsof disparate legal systems.  Accordingly, it will be important, for that additional reason, to beattentive to the manner in which the primary locus of United States public procurement lawexceptionalism cuts across the boundaries erected by disparate definitions of the ambit of publicprocurement law. A second major thread to the re-examination of exceptionalism in United Statesgovernment procurement law system undertaken here seeks to identify and understand the
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12 In referring to military procurement here, I refer both to procurement ofarmaments–“hard defense procurement” and procurement of other categories of goods andservices the need for and of use which may not be unique to military contexts.
reason(s) for the prevalence of a strong exceptionalist influence in that system. Here it is claimedthat the historic centrality of  military procurement in the development  of the United Statesprocurement law regime --itself a relatively unusual phenomenon when viewed in comparativeperspective, is the single most important cause for the strongly exceptionalist flavor of much ofthe United States’  public procurement law.12  Numerous examples are presented to support thisconclusion.  The basic modes of analysis employed to support this causal explanation arehistorical and doctrinal: a survey of  the development of key exceptionalist features of the UnitedStates procurement law regime, identifying the role played by military procurement in theemergence of the relevant doctrines in key cases.   Although the underlying policy considerations will bear closer examination as we workthrough the examples that support my causal explanation, it certainly should not be surprisingthat engrossing military procurement within the system of public procurement law would shiftthe law of public procurement in an exceptionalist direction.  At least in the United States’judicial tradition, but likely elsewhere as well, courts generally will be least prepared to strictly orindependently scrutinize the justification for government action whenever military necessity ornational security interests are invoked.  In addition, the shifting fortunes of war and theaccompanying “fog of war” commonly produce circumstances that were not foreseen at the timethe parties entered into contracts related to military activities.  Finally, contracts for militaryequipment commonly seek goods and services that are subject to unusually rapid technologicalinnovation that makes frequent changes in specifications and needs especially common.  For all
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 10these reasons, departures by government from its contractual commitments will be most readilyexcused in such military contexts.  Retention of flexibility to adjust to unforeseen circumstanceswill be most compellingly justified in such contexts.   In short, justification for departures fromthe rules of private contractual obligation and excuse will be most compelling in militaryprocurement cases.  Many systems of procurement law outside the United States have exemptedmilitary procurement from the coverage of their requirements precisely to respond to theseimportant policy considerations.  However, as we see in more detail below, when theprocurement law system is built around the needs and exigencies of military procurement, as wasthe case in the United States, the procurement law doctrine that results is far more likely to buildin the substantial flexibility and significant latitude for adjustment of government obligations,powers and immunities of the kind that we have labeled exceptionalism.The central role played by military procurement in the development of the exceptionalisttendency in United States public procurement law has evident importance for an understandingof the interplay of congruence and exceptionalism in United States public procurement law evenif that body of law were still to be studied in isolation, as long was the custom of United Statesgovernment contracts lawyers.  However, just as the locus of exceptionalism in the United Stateslaw governing performance of government contracts had both domestic and comparative lawsignificance, so too does role played by military procurement in providing the primacyexplanation for exceptionalism in the procurement law regime of the United States.  Although afull exploration of this point transcends the reach of this paper, an association will be suggestedbetween exclusion of military procurement from the coverage of many procurement law regimesoutside the United States, and the tendency toward emphasizing congruence over exceptionalism
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13“Id.  at 117.  
in the law governing the rights and responsibilities of government regarding performance ofgovernment contracts in such systems.  Ideally, this association should be more fully explored by examining the publicprocurement law of many nations to demonstrate more comprehensively the correlation betweenexclusion of military procurement from regulation and a adoption of a congruence-orientedapproach to public contract performance law and norms.  The goal of such further study wouldbe to corroborate the present hypothesis:  that a strong exceptionalist bent is more likely toblossom when military procurement is included within the rules governing public procurementgenerally.  If this correlation is borne out, and if, as is claimed here, coverage of militaryprocurement is a significant cause of the exceptionalist bent of the United States’ procurementlaw system, this relationship suggests strong policy consequences that should be carefullyconsidered by developing and transitional economies seeking to implement western styletransparent and competitive public procurement regimes, as well as by experts seeking to fosterthe transfer of best practices from the United States to developing nations.  I seek here to buildthe case for the suggestion that I previously have made that the United States’ experience provides evidence that suggests that . . . inclusion [ofmilitary procurement within the coverage of a nascent scheme of procurement law in adeveloping nation] may be very helpful to the development of key flexibility deviceswithin the corpus of government procurement law– both to the recognition of the policyneeds that such devices serve and to the legitimacy they can possess.13 It is entirely understandable that political and/or judicial decisions to exclude militaryprocurement from the coverage of a new procurement law regime may make procurementregulation and reform more palatable politically  in some quarters in developing and transitional
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14In the introduction to their treatise on comparative law, Zweigert and Kotz explain theinherent difficulty of the comparative law enterprise:Comparative lawyers have long known that only rules which perform the same functionand address the same real problem or conflict of interests can profitably be compared. They also know that they must cut themselves loose from their own doctrinal andjuridical preconceptions and liberate themselves from their own cultural context in orderto discover ‘neutral’ concepts with which to describe such problems or conflicts ofinterest . . . .  Legal sociologists not only accept this but apply it with a rigor which thecomparative lawyer finds stimulating, if a bit worrying, for legal sociologists cansometimes show that concepts and features which the comparative lawyer regards as
regimes.  Still, such decisions may have unintended consequences even for the character of thepublic procurement law regime governing non-military procurement.  The distinctivecontribution that military procurement has made to the exceptionalist character of United Statespublic procurement law has been important, perhaps indeed essential, to the emergence of theflexibility devices that are key hallmark of that procurement regime.  Moreover, it is suggestedboth here, and in the author’s previous work, that this exceptionalist character is, generallyspeaking, a positive legacy of the development of procurement rules designed for a template ofmilitary procurement.   In sum, exclusion of military procurement from the coverage ofprocurement law in emerging procurement systems may have negative spillover effects thattranscend the area of military procurement itself.Finally, the present examination of  the exceptionalist tendency in the United Statespublic procurement system is important the exceptionalism/congruence spectrum has value as atool that can enhance comparative law analysis in the field of public procurement law.  Plainly adirect comparison, in isolation, of features of disparate legal systems, even when those featuresappear to fill parallel functions and occupy comparable niches, is hazardous, and likely to beconfusing and unreliable, if not downright misleading.14  The exceptionalism/congruence
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‘neutral’ and therefore suitable for the definition of the problem are in fact nationally orculturally conditioned, or that they implicitly presuppose the existence of a particularsocial context which in reality only exists in one of the places under comparison and notin the other.  Konrad Zweigert & Heinrich Kotz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed., Tr. TonyWeir; Oxford U. Press, 1998), p. 10-11.  For further elaboration of this point, see also id. at 36-40.  John Henry Merryman has explained some of the hazards and pitfalls of attempting to docomparative law analysis:Legal rules are what most people think of as law, and a good deal of the work ofcomparative lawyers is devoted to the description and evaluation of such rules.  Much ofthe concern about the divergence of legal systems is phrased in terms of rules, and muchof the effort toward unification of law is rule-oriented.  But there is a very importantsense in which a focus on rules is superficial and misleading: superficial because becauserules literally lie on the surface of legal systems whose true dimensions are foundelsewhere; misleading because we are led to assume that if rules are made to resembleeach other something significant by way of rapprochement has been accomplished . . . .John Henry Merryman, The Convergence (and Divergence of the Civil Law and the CommonLaw, in Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE  (Boston,Sijthoff Pub. Co. 1978), p. 222-223, quoted in John H. Barton, James Lowell Gibbs, Jr., VictorHao Li & John Henry Merryman, LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES (West Pub. Co.1983), p. 1.
spectrum, however, is a construct that can help us sidestep some of the pitfalls entailed in suchdirect comparisons.  For that construct is based on a comparison that operates, initially, within the confines ofa given legal system.  That is, this approach starts with a comparison of a particular feature of thelaw of government contracts in a given legal system with the analogous rules concerning privatecontracting, within the same legal system.  Specifically, this construct poses the question ofwhether government contracting parties and private contracting parties have different liabilitiesand immunities with regard to the performance or alteration of their respective agreements. Under the approach suggested here, it is only after that initial assessment of congruence and
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 14exceptionalism within a particular legal system has been undertaken that comparisons are to bedrawn directly between two legal systems.  Once the initial assessment of exceptionalism and congruence has been made within eachof the systems to be compared, a valid meta-comparison between two systems can and should bemade, analysis focusing on the degree of exceptionalism or congruence manifested within eachof the systems being compared.  Proceeding in this manner, it is possible to compare systemswithout running so seriously afoul of the problems that are conventionally understood to makemore direct comparison of isolated bits of disparate legal systems inherently confusing,unreliable  and misleading.  While this article does not presume to implement this plan ofcomparative analysis, comparing the United States’ procurement law system and any other publicprocurement law system, in any comprehensive fashion, it does offer preliminary evidence tosupport the conclusion that coverage of  military procurement within a nation’s procurement lawsystem is correlated with an exceptionalist approach to procurement law and policy and thatexclusion of military procurement is associated with a congruence approach.  In addition, thisArticle delineates a method for undertaking such a comparative analysis and makes an argumentfor special utility of comparative analysis employing this approach.  The next portion of this Article, Part II, comprises a survey of significant exceptionalistdoctrines in the United States’ law of public procurement.  There I seek to sharpen our definitionof exceptionalism, to identify the primary locus of exceptionalism, and to substantiate the strongassociation that the author has postulated between the law of performance of governmentcontracts and the exceptionalist tendency within the larger corpus of United States governmentcontract law.   The survey of exceptionalist doctrines demonstrates that exceptionalism in the law
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 15of public procurement, as I have defined it here, is primarily, though not exclusively, a creatureof the law governing federal public contract performance, rather than contract formation.Part III of this Article makes the case for a strong causal link between the consistentcentrality of military procurement in the development of the procurement legal regime in theUnited States and the striking exceptionalist strain in United States’ public procurement law. Initially, in Part III(A), we confront a methodological difficulty inherent in making this kind ofclaim about the “causes” of an important feature of United States law, or any analogous claimabout the antecedents of any legal doctrine.  This difficulty is in part a product of the inherentdifficulty of establishing historic causation in any setting, and  a fortiori in attempting to accountfor the origins of any legal doctrine.   But the difficulty is also inherent in the nature of thecomparative law enterprise to which this Article seeks to make a contribution.   While thesedifficulties of causal explanation and comparative analysis are real, and must be acknowledgedforthrightly, this Article identifies a methodology that enables us to move the argument forward,without pretending to complete the comparative analysis.  Like much scholarship that proposesan analytical framework for a distinctive body of law, this Article invites extension of the workpresented in the form of contributions from other scholars examining the same problems indifferent legal settings, including those of radically different legal cultures. Part III(B) of this Article attempts, in relatively brief compass, to establish a basic claim that is predominantly descriptive, about the United States’ procurement law system.  This is aclaim the truth of which probably is taken for granted by those who are familiar with that system. It is simply that military procurement and its regulation have served as the template for thedevelopment of the entire United States public procurement law regime, both historically, and on
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 16into the current era.  At least until the post-World War II era, civilian agency procurement and itsregulation were been relatively minor parts of this regulatory system.  Civilian procurement wasnot the main driving force behind the development of the innovative legal regime that supportsthe United States’ federal public procurement system.  Although this point is taken for granted bymany who are knowledgeable about the operation of the United States’ system, the centrality ofmilitary procurement to the regulated procurement system of the United States in factdistinguishes it from the transparent and competitive procurement regimes of most otherdeveloped nations.Finally, in Part III C, I present the causal argument about the role of military procurementin establishing an exceptionalist procurement regime.  Using selected, but representative,examples of significant exceptionalist doctrines, I endeavor to demonstrate the unusuallyimportant role that the military procurement context has played in leading judicial decisions andlegislative and administrative developments that have established the exceptionalist flavor ofUnited States federal public procurement law.  Based on a review of these examples, one couldhardly fail to recognize the impact of military procurement in establishing the character of thisbody of law.  Although further comparative law analysis is required to provide another kind ofevidence that could corroborate my claim here, review of the internal development of the UnitedStates federal public procurement law regime strongly supports the theory that militaryprocurement has caused the strikingly exceptional character of that system of law. 
II. What is Exceptionalism?  Where and When Does it Occur?To define exceptionalism in the United States law of public procurement with greater
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15 See, e.g. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2 (FAR prescribed standardized Termination forConvenience Clause for fixed-price contracts for goods and services).  See John Cibinic & RalphNash, ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS(3d ed. 1995) (hereinafter“ADMINISTRATION”), at 1073-1134 .   Fact patterns in which termination for convenience maysuccessfully be invoked plainly include many in which the government’s action, would if theclause is inapplicable or unenforceable, be a breach of contract, giving rise to full loss-of-profitsexpectancy damages, just as these facts would in a dispute between parties to a private contract.  
precision, it is critical, initially, to identify doctrines and practices that should be identified asleading examples of the phenomenon of exceptionalism.  As indicated in the Introduction, oursurvey will reveal that the bulk, though surely not all, of these are to be found  in the lawgoverning federal government contract performance and disputes associated with contract performance, rather than that addressed to public contract formation.  The survey that follows isnecessarily selective, and the explanation of salient doctrines limited; otherwise it wouldinexorably develop into a treatise on the law of United States government contracts law.   Thewatchword for what follows is to provide the reader with enough documentation to support theanalysis undertaken and the conclusions drawn therefrom.
A. Exceptionalism in the Law Governing Public Contract Performance and PerformanceDisputesAmong the salient examples of exceptionalism that arise in the area of the law relating topublic contract performance are the following: • the far-reaching power of federal government contracting officers to terminate a contract“for the convenience of the government” in a very wide range of circumstances, even inthe absence of any contractor’s breach, without incurring full liability for expectancydamages15
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In addition, the broad power conferred by the termination for convenience clause risks deprivingthe government contract of consideration sufficient to render it enforceable, at least under thestandards of private contracts.  See Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 768-772 (Ct. Cl.1982) (opinion of Bennett, J.); see also G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418,423-424 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965) (portraying breach as “normal”contract law classification for conduct treated as subject to termination for convenience clause,where it is applicable). 
16See, e.g 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1 (Federal Acquisition Regulation (hereinafter “FAR”)provision prescribing a standardized changes clause for inclusion in fixed price contracts).  See,Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15, at 381-485 (summarizing the law of publiccontract “changes”).  Such changes would, which may radically alter the performance that thecontract is called upon to deliver or the profit that it may ultimately receive, would in the contextof an ordinary private contract, likely be considered breaches of the contract.  This appearsparticularly to be true in cases where the constructive change label was applied after the fact by acourt to requirements imposed by the  the contracting officer that he or she did notcontemporaneously recognize as enlarging the contractor’s obligations beyond those prescribedin contract itself.  See, e.g. W. H. Edwards Enginr’g Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 322 (1963). Alternatively, in an ordinary private contract the retention of the power unilaterally to make suchchanges might well be considered to make the government’s contractual undertaking “illusory”and the contract, accordingly, unenforceable.
17 See, e.g. 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-12 (FAR-prescribed standardized Suspension of Workclause for fixed price construction contract); 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-13 (FAR-prescribedstandardized Stop-Work Order Clause for contracts for supply of goods or services); 48 C.F.R. §
! the broad power of federal government contracting officers unilaterally to institutesubstantial changes in the scope and nature of the work to be performed under thecontract, in return for which the contractor is assured of an “equitable adjustment” --without the government either incurring full liability for breach (at the time of theunilateral change order) or voiding the contract ab initio;16• the broad power of federal government contracting officers unilaterally to suspend ordefer the performance of a government contract, again without either incurring fullliability for breach or voiding the contract, in return for which the contractor is againassured an “equitable adjustment;”17
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52.212-15 (FAR-prescribed standardized constructive suspension clause for use in contracts forthe supply of goods or services).  See Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15, at 586-618.  Like the institution of a change order, a suspension order or constructive suspension arisingfrom delay covered by the foregoing provisions, might well, in their absence, be regarded as afully compensable breach of contract.  This is particularly true of the constructive suspensionauthority, which takes effect with regard to delays that were not contemporaneously characterized by a contracting officer as an exercise of suspension authority.  See, e.g. Hoel-Steffen Construc.Co., 456 F.2d 460 (Ct. of Cl. 1972)(illustrating that fact pattern).  Alternatively, thegovernment’s retention in the contract of this broad authority unilaterally to adjust the timingrequired for the contractor’s performance and the timing of its own contractually obligatedpayments, might well, in an ordinary private contract, render the agreement illusory andunenforceable.  
18 See, e.g. Arrow Lacquer Corp., ASBCA No. 4667, Navy Appeals Panel, Contract #N383-32050A (Oct. 31, 1958)(slight color deviation from standard in color of primer coat ofpaint is ground for termination for default even though the primer coast is covered by a top coatand no suggestion was made as to how or why the trivial color discrepancy might affectperformance); De Vito v. United States, 413 F.2d 1147, 1154-1155 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (time is “of theessence” in any government contract containing a fixed date for performance–unless the time forperformance is waived by the words or deeds of authorized government agents); but see FranklinE. Penny Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 668 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (suggesting that time was notnecessarily always of the essence in a government contract).  See Cibinic & Nash,ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15, at 908-918.  Note that the FAR provisions governing default termination generally provide threecategories of grounds for such termination: 1) violation of  a qualitative performancespecification, 2) actually missing an interim or final contractual performance deadline, and 3)conduct that seriously endangers the ultimate timely performance of the contract,.  See, e.g. 48C.F.R. § 52.249-8 (prescribing a standardized termination for default clause for fixed pricesupply and service contracts).  The very existence of the third category reveals that, both as totimeliness and as to measures of qualitative performance, the government contractor has lesslatitude than its counterpart on a purely private contract to avoid liability by asserting that anyshortcoming of its own performance was non-material. 
• the “strict compliance rule”: that is, the absence of any materiality threshold when thegovernment wishes to terminate a government contract for default because of defects inthe contractor’s performance;18 
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19This noteworthy exceptionalist feature of the law about default termination of federalpublic contracts is expressly reflected in the termination for default clause. See, e.g. 48 C.F.R. §52.249-8 (default termination clause for fixed price supply and service contracts.) The second ofthe three generic grounds for default termination of a federal public contract that is notedabove–endangering the ultimate timely performance of a government contract–does not appear tohave any full counterpart in the law of private contracts.  This provision allows the governmentto terminate when the contractor has not actually missed any fixed contractual requirement oftimely performance.  Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15, at 929-935.  Such afailure to progress without actually missing a deadline for performance under the contract wouldnot, absent the exceptional provisions of the standard clauses governing termination for defaultof government contracts, constitute a breach by the contractor were the standards that apply toprivate agreements to be applied.  United States v. O’Brien, 220 U.S. 321, 327 (1911) (Holmes,J.) (contrasting federal procurement doctrine with state contract law on this point).
20 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).  
21 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (refining, applying anddistinguishing Clearfield Trust as described further infra note 23).
22 Clearfield was noteworthy, and perhaps a surprise because it was decided shortly afterErie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), had strongly underscored the importance, forfederalism reasons, of using state law rules as the rules of decision for cases decided in federalcourts, absent a rule of decision provided by the federal positive law.  It is familiar ground thatErie rested in part on the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. §1652, and in part on principles ofconstitutional federalism.  The well-known holding of Erie is the categorical declaration that“[t]here is no federal general common law.” 304 U.S. at 78. In Clearfield the issue was whether the rights of the United States with respect tocommercial paper that it issues–a government check– are governed by state or federal law.  
• the government’s right to terminate a contractor for default because of the contractor’sslow progress that endangers ultimate timely performance even where the contractor hasnot missed any ultimate or interim contractual deadline or benchmark for performance;19• the principles of  Clearfield Trust20 and its sequelae,21 which establish that interpretationof federal government contracts is, inherently, a question of federal law, even though statelaw would generally govern disputes arising under private contracts that are adjudicatedin federal court.22   These principles dictate, moreover, that federal judge-made law
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There was no federal statute addressing the specific issue presented and the relevant federalregulations did not address the specific question presented either.  318 U.S. at 366-367 & n.2. Moreover the Court did not identify any constitutional provision that dictated the rule of decisionor dictated that it be a federal rule of decision.  Although the Rules of Decision Act itselfspecifies that state law should govern disputes in federal court “except where the Constitution ortreaties of the United States otherwise require or provide,” 28 U.S.C. §1652 (emphasis added),the Court nonetheless concluded that federal law–  if necessary, judge-made– should control thecase.  The Court explained:When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising aconstitutional function or power.  This check was issued for services performed under theFederal Emergency Relief Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115.  The authority to issue the check hadits origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no waydependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or any other state . . . .   The duties imposed on theUnited States and the rights acquired by it as a result of that issuance find their roots inthe same federal sources.  In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for thefederal courts to fashion the governing rule according to their own standards . . . . 318 U.S. at 366-367 (emphasis added; footnote omitted.)   What is significant here is just howweak the argument for application of federal law should have appeared in light of the then-recentErie decision.  There was no applicable Constitutional provision cited, and no constitutional“require[ment] or provi[sion]” dictating a federal rule of decision can be identified.  Similarly, nostatutory basis for the application of federal law can be identified that appears to rise to the levelof a “require[ment] or provi[sion]” dictating creation of a federal rule of decision.  The fact thatfederal government contracts arise out of the functioning of the federal government seems to beenough to dictate a federal rule of decision, even though the threshold for escaping the operationof the Rules of Decision Act had not been met in literal terms.  And the court ignores entirely anyobstacle to this result posed by the extra-statutory dimension given to the Rules of Decision Actin Erie itself.
23 It is important to recognize that Clearfield has this second layer of exceptionalism, inaddition to the first. Even after the Court determined that the rule of decision should be federal,and judge-made, if there is a gap in relevant positive federal law, the Court goes on to considerthe subsidiary question whether, in fashioning federal common law to meet the needs of the casefor a rule of decision, a federal court should borrow–that is, voluntarily adopt as its own– therelevant state law decisional law. Id. at 367.  But the Court rejected that alternative for most
should ordinarily be fashioned to fill any gaps in the relevant positive law, leaving littleoccasion for the borrowing of the state law rules that normally govern private contracts tofill these gaps.23
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 22
federal contract disputes, noting that federal government’s powerful interest in having a uniformset of rules to govern its vast array of contracts–in this case checks– of a particular characterrequired that there be a uniform federal rule of decision, rather than a borrowing of any state law.Id. The exceptionalist character of the rule of Clearfield is underscored in deliciously ironicfashion when the Supreme Court then proceeded, entirely unselfconsciously it appears, to justifythe creation of a federal body of commercial common law to govern cases like this, by pointingto the availability of the body of “federal law merchant, developed for about a century under theregime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1,” which “stands as a convenient source of reference forfashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions.” 318 U.S. at 367.   Of course, Swiftv. Tyson is the decision that was overruled by Erie, which effectively decreed that this body of“federal law merchant” should be no more!Despite the doubly exceptionalist approach taken in Clearfield, the subsequent decision inKimbell Foods (see supra note 20) has qualified this second layer of exceptionalism, but only toa modest degree and in respects unrelated to typical federal procurement contracts.   In KimbellFoods, the Court listed 3 factors that should enter into the choice whether to borrow state lawrules to supply the federal rule of decision or to “fashion a nationwide [judge-made] federalrule.” 440 U.S. at 727-728.  These are :•  whether the particular federal program inherently requires uniform of  nationwideoperation that would “necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules” (id. at728);• whether even “[a]part from considerations of uniformity . . . [borrowing] of state law[-derived rules] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs” (id..); and • whether the “application of a [judge-made uniform federal common law] rule woulddisrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law” (id. at 729).  In other words, isthere a strong interest in borrowing state law to decide the rights of federal parties so as toharmonize and integrate the law governing their rights with the web of law applicable tothe non-federal interests.The Clearfield rule, even as amplified by Kimbell, affords striking latitude for fashioningfederal rules of decision to govern federal questions arising in disputes involving federalcontracts.  Moreover, the Clearfield/Kimbell analysis leaves almost no room for the borrowing ofstate law to govern questions arising in federal public procurement.  Because of the voluminousprovisions and extensive reach of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its supplements,together with that of the federal statutes applicable to government contracts, there is relativelyrarely a gap in federal positive law that even invites the possibility of borrowing state law. Moreover, even when there is such a gap, application of the Kimbell 3 factor analysis willvirtually never lead to borrowing of state law.  In federal procurement cases, there is invariably acompelling need for a nationally uniform rule to govern the nationally uniform activity ofprocurement.  Morover, there are invariably strong federal interests in the operation of the federalprogram that would be undercut by application of state law that would preclude borrowing of
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state law.  See, e.g. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963)(state may not constitutionallyenforce its milk sale minimum price regulation with respect to contracts for sale of milk tofederal instrumentalities).  And finally, it would be unusual for there to be any compellinginterest –arising from the need for integration of federal and private transactions– to makeoperation of the rules governing federal procurement track the rules governing privatetransactions.  Most federal procurement is simply too discrete an activity to warrant any suchconclusion.  Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5, at 775-776. Taken one at a time these arguments generally are quite strong; collectively their impact willalmost never permit borrowing of state law. In sum, the contrast between the unique federal lawregime that governs federal procurement under federal positive law, including the FAR, togetherwith Clearfield/Kimbell and, on the other hand, the regime of state law that governs analogousprivate contract disputes –even when they arise in federal court– under the Erie doctrine, reflectsa profoundly exceptionalist approach.
24See G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied,382 U.S. 821 (1965).
25 In G.L. Christian, the seminal case, in 1958 the United States Army had terminated, forthe convenience of the government,  a contract for the construction of a large complex of militarypersonnel housing at Fort Polk, Louisiana.  See infra TANs ___-___ for discussion of thetermination for convenience clause and the associated doctrines.  The termination forconvenience was triggered by a decision to deactivate Fort Polk itself in 1958.  The responsiblecontracting officer, however, evidently mistakenly omitted the standard termination forconvenience clause from this construction contract.  Accordingly, the contractor asserted that thegovernment had not reserved the power to terminate for convenience and was accordingly liablefor breach of contract.  In practical effect, the difference was this: under a termination forconvenience clause the contractor would be entitled to be made whole by allowing it recovery ofall expenses reasonably incurred prior to the contract termination and unavoidable ongoing
Still other key exceptionalist rules that are applied in the law governing contractperformance in the federal public procurement system include:• the G.L. Christian24 doctrine, which holds that standardized clauses that ought to havebeen included in a federal government contract, but which were omitted due to an error offederal agents, should nonetheless be read into the contracts from which they weremistakenly omitted;25 and 
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expenses.  By contrast, the contractor asserted the right to full expectancy damages, includingrecovery of the anticipated profits that it would have earned had the contract performance goneforward. 312 F.2d at 419, 423-424. The court of appeals held that because the government’s statutorily-authorizedprocurement regulations directed that a standardized termination for convenience clause shouldhave been included in this construction contract, “the contract must be read as if it did,” eventhough it actually omitted the required language. Id. at 424.   Some language in the court’sopinion might suggest that the result was limited to cases where an experienced defensecontractor specifically should have known that the omitted clause was required to be, and wasintended to be, included. Id. at 426-427.  However, subsequent decisions have treated this as abright line rule and have obviated any inquiry into whether the particular contractor knew orshould have known of the particular required clause that was omitted.  Schwartz, PROCUREMENTLAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5, at {123}. 
26 In the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the United States waived sovereignimmunity, consenting to be sued on a variety of classes of claims, including “any claim againstthe United States founded  . . .  upon any express or implied contract with the United States.” The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently “held that this jurisdiction extends onlyto contracts either express or implied in fact, and not to claims on contracts implied in law.”Hercules, Inc. v. United States,   516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996).  Thus the United States retains itssovereign immunity from claims under any implied in law contract.  Hercules sets forth thetraditional delineation between contracts implied-in-fact (on which the United States can besued) and contracts implied in law:The distinction between “implied in fact” and “implied in law,” and the consequentlimitation, is well established in our cases. An agreement implied in fact is “foundedupon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, isinferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surroundingcircumstances, their tacit understanding.” . . . .  By contrast, an agreement implied in lawis a “fiction of law” where “a promise is imputed to perform a legal duty, as to repaymoney obtained by fraud or duress.”417 U.S. at 423-424 (citations omitted).  The exceptionalist character of this particular doctrinallimitation on the liability of the United States emerges, of course, from the fact that liability forprivate parties operating under private agreements can arise both for breach of breach of implied-in-fact contracts and for breach of implied-in-law contracts. 
• the immunity of the federal government from liability under any contract “implied inlaw.”26
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27See supra TAN ___.
28 The exact contours and the history and policy foundations of the Sovereign Acts andUnmistakability Doctrines are complex, controversial and difficult subjects.  There is no need forpresent purposes to immerse the reader in the details of these sometimes arcane doctrines.  Thepresent author has written extensively to address these matters elsewhere, and refers theinterested reader to that body of earlier work for a more detailed account. See Schwartz, Liabilityfor Sovereign Acts, supra note 1;  Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1; Schwartz, Wakeof Winstar, supra note 1;  Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5,at {175-178, 191-196, 208-209}. In addition, in Part IIIC of this Article, a brief account is offered of the historical genesisof the Sovereign Acts Doctrine, which will afford the reader some concrete examples of its
Many of the foregoing exceptionalist doctrines will be striking, indeed, to thoseaccustomed to the norms of private contract law.  Perhaps the single most striking example of theexceptionalist phenomenon, however, is the government’s broad power to terminate a federalprocurement contract “for the convenience of the government,” noted above.27  Nonetheless, asstriking as the government’s special power to terminate its contracts for its own “convenience”may be, the true apotheosis of exceptionalism is found elsewhere--in the sovereign acts doctrine,and the related unmistakability doctrine, described here in the ensuing text.These two interrelated and overlapping doctrines together require that governmentcontracts be read to reserve to the government an extraordinary generic power.   They accord thegovernment the power to take, without incurring liability, a broad range of acts in the course ofexercising of its sovereign authority to regulate and other sovereign powers.  Although these actsmay have the practical effect of interfering substantially with the government’s own obligationsunder a government contract, or burdening  the contractor’s prescribed performance, and mightappear to constitute a breach of contract were it carried out by a private party in parallelcircumstances, these doctrines, where applicable, excuse the government from liability.28  
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application and typical effect. See infra TAN ___-___.
29 Central difficulties in mapping the contours of the Sovereign Acts and UnmistakabilityDoctrines arise both 1) from the fact that the government frequently enters into agreements forwhich there is no plausible private analogue, and 2) frequently acts in a manner that has thepractical effecting of undermining the performance of its own contracts by exercisinggovernmental powers that no private party could exercise.  These twin facts underlie the policyjustification for creating the sovereign acts and unmistakability doctrines.  But they also render incoherent many of the courts efforts to prescribe the proper scope and effect of the operation ofthis doctrine.  See Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1, at 653-658; 689-691,697-702; Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1, at 520-523, 552-565; Schwartz, Wake ofWinstar, supra note 1, at 1193-1197. 
These last examples of exceptionalism in the law of federal public contract performance, the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability doctrines, makes clear why these doctrines are classifiedas exceptionalist.  Applying the norms of private contracts the kind of governments actions thatare excused by these doctrines generally would be regarded as a breach of contract.29 Alternatively the very reservation of the wide-ranging immunity reserved by the governmentwould likely void the contract, were it a private engagement, because it would render theundertaking optional or too uncertain, resulting in a failure of consideration or an illusorycontract.  The Sovereign Acts Doctrine and Unmistakability Doctrine also offer particularly potent evidence of the exceptionalist character of  the norms of public contract performance inthe United States because these particular doctrines provide allow the government a universallyapplicable set of rules of construction,  powers and immunities, potentially overriding andsupplementing a broad array of  more specific doctrines of contract interpretation andperformance.  The government’s broad termination for convenience authority shares this generalcharacteristic of acting as a sort of “universal solvent” for normal contract obligations.Other examples of exceptionalist contract performance-related rules with the particularly 
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30 See supra TANs ___-___ (regarding Clearfield) & note ___ (regarding G.L. Christian)
31 See infra TAN ___-___ (regarding G.L. Christian). 
32 Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15.
broad reach and sweeping effect that distinguish the termination for convenience doctrine, andthe Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines that are worthy of being singled out here  arethe choice of law doctrine of Clearfield Trust and the omission-filling rule of  G.L. Christian30that are described above.   By governing and supplementing the applicable body of law, thesedoctrines directly and indirectly assure that federal government contracts are interpreted andenforced under a uniform regime that is constructed to take into account the to the special needs,and policy priorities of the government, as well as the exigencies it may face.  G.L. Christianeffectively blends a breach-excusing rule with this kind of government-friendly specializedchoice of law rule.31Plainly a full description of the operation of each of these doctrines is beyond the reachand scope of this article.  Indeed, one way of stating my basic point in this Part of this Article isto reflect that, because of their number, their far-reaching impact, and their pervasiveness in theUnited States’ law of performance of public contracts, such a full description of theseexceptionalist doctrines would convert this Article, willy-nilly,  into a replication of Nash andCibinic’s leading treatise on ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.32  In the foregoingdiscussion, I accordingly have settled for brief explanations, with citations in the margins tosample provisions of the FAR, a few illustrative cases, and cross references to an authoritative treatise.  The discussion that has been provided nonetheless should suffice to establish a key
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33 For the benefit of any reader less familiar with basic public contract law doctrines, it isnoted here that Part IIIC of this paper will describe in more detail the emergence of selectedexceptionalist doctrines.  In particular, there the reader will find a fuller account of  two of themost dramatically exceptionalist doctrines that operate in the United States’ law of performanceof government contracts: the broad power of the United States to terminate its contracts “for theconvenience of the government,” and Sovereign Acts Doctrine, which saves the governmentfrom liability for breach in a wide range of circumstances. 
34 See supra TAN 5-7.
aspect of my thesis in this Part of this Article: that there is a strikingly exceptionalist cast tomuch of the law of federal public contracts and that that tendency is prominently on display inthe law that governs disputes arising out of the performance of federal public contracts.  Part IIBnow  moves on to survey the incidence of exceptionalism elsewhere in the United States’ law offederal public contracts.33   
B. Exceptionalism in Other Contexts: “Reverse” or “Positive” ExceptionalismAs mentioned at the outset, government procurement law rules that have an exceptionalistcast are not entirely limited to the body of law that governs disputes about the performance ofsuch contracts.  As we shall see, this conclusion will stand even after a significant clarification asto the proper understanding of government contracts “exceptionalism” is established here. Specifically, government contracts rules are properly considered to be exceptionalist only whenthey excuse the government from duties or obligations that it might otherwise bear, or lend itpowers or immunities that it otherwise would lack, were its rights judged under the normsapplicable to private parties that have entered into private contracts.34  Exceptionalism in the lawof public procurement, then, should be understood to denote only these kinds of rules, which
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35See supra TAN notes 7-8 & note 8.
36 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
37This perspective would appear germane in assessing the argument that some of thefeatures of the government contracts law regime effectively operate as barriers to entry into themarket to provide goods and services to the government, and thereby undesirably contract thatmarketplace by discouraging and deterring entry by those not established as governmentcontractors. See William Kovacic,  Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in GovernmentProcurement, 25 POLICY SCIENCES 29 (1991).  At the same time, this perspective is not offeredas a refutation to the concerns identified by Kovacic’s analysis. This is in part because the cost ofexceptionalism to putative contractors may outweigh the value to them of the government’s
reflect what the author has sometimes labeled negative exceptionalism, because they reduce thegovernment’s duties and obligations, and subject contractors to enhanced government powersand immunities.35  By contrast, there is, of course, a broad array of doctrines, primarily applicable to theformation of federal public procurement contracts, that impose procedural duties and substantivestandards on the United States that a private contracting party would not bear.  Theserequirements,  might better be labeled “reverse” exceptionalism” because they increase ratherthan reduce the duties and obligations of the government, and are quite distinct from thephenomenon of exceptionalism that is under study here.36  Of course, one may quite plausiblyview these two phenomena as inextricably intertwined facets of a single phenomenon that setsthe rules of engagement for those who would enter into the government contracting market. Under these rules of engagement, the government contractor or would-be contractor is effectivelytold that the extra obligations the government will bear, especially in contract formation (“reverseexceptionalism”), come with a price tag in the form of the exceptionalist powers and immunitiesthat the government will enjoy once the contract has been awarded.37
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unique affirmative obligations in some or even many settings.  Moreover, it is important toemphasize that not all reverse exceptionalist burdens borne by the procuring agency under thefederal procurement law regime actually translate into benefits for the contractor or would becontractor.  It is more likely, however, that most, if not all, of the benefits to the government oftrue exceptionalism are experienced by contractors as additional costs and risks of doing businesswith the government.  Accordingly, even though the benefits and costs to contractors ofexceptionalism and reverse exceptionalism should be assessed as a package, in appraising thebarriers to entry issue raised by Kovacic, that accounting must be done in particularized fashion,focusing on the distinctive impact on contractors of particular rules under scrutiny, if it is to bemeaningful as a tool for policy analysis.  It also remains true that there may be important publicmonetary and non-monetary values served by exceptionalist government contracts rules that mayjustify their net social cost, even if a particularized assessment were to reveal that the net effectof the government contract law regime taken as a whole is to serve as a significant barrier toentry to this marketplace.  
3810 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1)(A)( regarding military and NASA contracting); 41 U.S.C. §253(a) (regarding contracting by most civilian agencies).  For subsequent examples of suchpositive exceptionalist requirements, citations are given only for the statutory provisionsapplicable to military contracting, although there are invariably parallel provisions in the statuteregulating civilian agency procurement with respect to the examples given.
39 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c).
4010 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2)
If only to demonstrate their distinctly different cast, the most salient illustrations of thisreverse exceptionalism should be mentioned very briefly here.  Most importantly, these includethe duties imposed on military and civilian agencies to award contracts after a process thatconstitutes “full and open competition,”38 unless there is both a substantive exception that isproperly applicable and, moreover, the required transparent procedures necessary properly toinvoke such an exception have been fulfilled.39 These also include the requirement to use anapproved transparent process of securing full and open competition, usually either sealed biddingor competitive negotiation/competitive proposals, and adherence to a structured set of criteriagoverning the choice of competitive procedure.40  There are detailed prescriptions as to the
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42 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(5)
43 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.103- 9.104 (FAR’s basic provisions regarding responsibilitydetermination); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (FAR provisions on causes for debarment)
44Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. V. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.1980)
criteria and procedures to be used by agencies in selecting a winning bidder or proposal fromamong the competing offers or proposals,41 “debriefing”–that is, advising, losing offerors as tothe agency’s reasons for favoring a competing proposal,42 and equally detailed rules andprocedures governing the determination of whether a contractor is qualified to receive a contractaward.43   In some cases the operation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause alsocontributes to the procedures that the government must observe in debarring a contractor, ormaking a recurring or stigmatizing non-responsibility determination.44  In each of these instancesprivate parties engaging in contractual procurement do not bear these same judicially enforceableobligations or any nearly analogous set of duties.  Although these are representative of some ofthe most salient government-unique duties that the government bears under the law ofgovernment contract formation, this scarcely exhausts the relevant category.   This listing shouldsuffice, however, to establish that although the law of government contract formation departsdramatically from the norms of private contracting, the overwhelming thrust of the departure is inthe direction of imposing extra duties on the government. These tend to be duties that affordwould-be government contractors the benefit of a transparent and competitive procurementregime, and thus do not resemble the kind of exceptionalism that the author has defined as a
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 32
45 There are, of course, also doctrines of government contract formation that tend tofollow the requirements of the law of private contract formation, reflecting congruence ratherthan exceptionalism, except insofar as particular requirements may be specifically modified byspecific exceptionalist requirements.  Significant examples of such doctrines include:• the rule that a binding offer followed by a binding acceptance yields a binding contractobligation (United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S. 313 (1919) (see infra TAN___-___));• the rule that consideration ordinarily is required to support a binding government contract(Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489 (1923); Torncello v. UnitedStates, 681 F.2d 756, 768-772 (Ct. Cl. 1982)); • the recognition of a “statute of frauds” requirement that most contracts be entered inwriting in order to be enforceable (United States v. American Renaissance Lines, 494F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1974); and • the rule that implied-in-fact contracts may be recognized as obligations of the UnitedStates (Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423-424 (1996); Algonac v. Mfg.Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
4631 U.S.C. §§ 3551- 3556 (bid protest authority of the General Accounting Office); 28U.S.C. § 1491(b) (bid protest jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims; former bid protestjurisdiction of the United States District Courts, in conjunction with the federal AdministrativeProcedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701- 706).
particular hallmark of the law of federal public procurement contract performance and disputespertaining thereto.45  Of course, as important, or even more important, in practical terms, than all of theforegoing requirements, in fastening special duties on procuring government agencies that haveno private sector counterparts, is the routine availability of judicial and non-judicial bid protestmechanisms that make the reverse exceptionalist doctrines enforceable.46  In realistic terms it isthe assurance of the enforceability of these requirements offered by the bid protest forums thatmakes these substantive and procedural reverse exceptionalist requirements of value tocontractors and a source of real obligation for government agencies engaged in procurement.  Insum, although government contract formation is marked by substantial departures from the
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norms of private contracting, most of those departures do not represent the exceptionalismdefined previously by the author or which is the focus of this Article, which indeedcharacteristically is found primarily in the law of public contract performance.  Some counter-examples, genuinely exceptionalist elements of the law of public contract formation and relateddoctrines, are considered in Part IIIC of this Article, which follows shortly.It is also noteworthy that the reverse exceptionalist requirements found in United Statespublic procurement law, such as the basic requirements for full and open competition and therules governing the procedures for competitive procurement, and the availability of bid protestprocedures, which were briefly listed in the Part IIB of this Article, form the heart of the commonground that exists between the norms of United States and the European Community regardingprocurement.  From the European Community point of view, in effect, the bulk of publicprocurement law lies in this category.  However, as we have emphasized here, the scope ofpublic procurement law in the United States, substantially transcends this category,encompassing the genuinely exceptionalist regime of public contract performance law that is sosignificant a part of the United States procurement system. 
C. Genuine Exceptionalism in the United States Law of Federal Public Contract Formation andLine-Straddling Doctrines
Despite the clear predominance of doctrines governing contract performance among theexceptionalist aspects of United States public procurement law, there are certainly significantdepartures from the norms of private contract law that pertain to the substantive norms for
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48United States Const., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7.
49See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 426-427 (1996) (re: Anti-DeficiencyAct); Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424-434 (1990)(re:Appropriations Clause); Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1284 (2002), cert. denied, 539U.S. 910 (2003) (dictum re: Anti-Deficiency Act).
contract formation and, most importantly, the process for selecting the government’s contractingpartner.  As noted in the previous section of this Article, these should be subdivided further intothe reverse exceptionalist rules surveyed in Part IIB that depart from the norms of privatecontract law by imposing special obligations on the government, and truly exceptionalistdoctrines that serve primarily to limit the liability or obligations of the government arising out ofcontracting.  As explained above, however, most of the departures from the norms of privatecontracting that pertain to contract formation fall into the former category of reverseexceptionalism. Still, there are some significant genuinely exceptionalist elements to the law of federalpublic contract formation in the United States that should be noted here briefly in order to givethe reader an accurate overall picture of the scope and incidence of exceptionalism in UnitedStates public contract law.  These include:• the Anti-Deficiency Act,47 and Appropriations Clause,48 which protect the United Statesfrom entering into a binding contract absent a covering appropriation made byCongress;49 and•  the regulatory requirement that, even without offering a binding option contract to thegovernment, a bid unsupported by consideration nonetheless ordinarily is binding and
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51Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990) (immunity fromequitable estoppel); FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (same); compare, e.g. GordonWoodroffe Corp. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 984, 988 (Ct. Cl. 1952)(U.S. not bound by agentacting without possessing actual authority), with id. at 988-989 (Madden, J., dissenting) (U.S.should be bound by act done with apparent authority).
52 E.g. Gordon Woodroffe, 104 F. Supp. at 988.
53 Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990);  Hercules, Inc. v.United States, 516 U.S. 417, 426-427 (1996). 
may not ordinarily be withdrawn after the date fixed for opening of bids.  Thegovernment may accept such a bid, despite a purported withdrawal, creating a bindingcontract, and hold the contractor liable for default if it declines to perform.50 
In addition to these doctrines that are characteristically part of the law of public contractformation, there are significant exceptionalist rules that affect both issues of contract formationand disputes arising out of contract performance.  Salient examples are the interrelated doctrinesthat apparent authority does not operate against the United States and that the United States isgenerally immune from the operation of equitable estoppel.51  These rules may be invoked to barrecognition of a contract ab initio where it is entered by a person who lacks actual authority.52  Orthey may be invoked to bar recognition of a binding contract where a contract is entered inviolation of applicable legal requirements.53  But they also may be invoked in a contractperformance dispute context to bar modification of the terms of a government contract where theofficer alleged to have agreed to the modification lacked the requisite authority or was acting in
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54General Electric Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1215, 1218 & n.4 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
55See John Cibinic & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (George Washington Univ. 3d ed. 1998) (hereinafter “FORMATION”), at 1238-1252 ; Ralph C.Nash, Jr., Steven L. Schooner & Karen R. O’Brien, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCEBOOK (George Washington Univ. 2d ed. 1998) (hereinafter “GOVERNMENT CONTRACTSREFERENCE BOOK”), at 243-244 (“Federal Supply Schedules”), 295-296 (“Indefinite-DeliveryContract”  and “Indefinite-Quantity Contract”), 355-365 (“Multiple Award Schedule”), 506-507(“Task Order” and “Task Order Contract”); Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: TheFundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 AMER. U. L. REV. 627, ___-___ (2001).
violation of applicable legal requirements.54  Another example of an exceptionalist departures from the norms of private contractingthat affects both contract formation and contract performance and disputes pertaining thereto isthe heavy reliance on open-ended contractual vehicles such as task order contracting and otherforms of Indefinite Delivery- Indefinite Quantity  (“IDIQ”) contracts, including the MultipleAward and Single Award Schedules under the Federal Supply Schedules, to meet many of theprocurement needs of federal agencies today.55   These special contract vehicles can presentformation issues, because, at least in the case of the Multiple Award Schedules, private lawnorms for consideration requisite to establish a binding contract do not appear to satisfied, yet aprivate contractor is bound by its offer to supply scheduled items on the basis for which it isscheduled.   But the primary effect of such an award is to enable to government to call upon acontractor, essentially at its unilateral discretion, to provide a level of service or goods,determined unilaterally, on a schedule that is determined unilaterally.  Thus these could beviewed as departures from the norms of private contracting with respect to both the formationand the performance of a contractual undertaking.   The dramatic potential for the use and abuseof such contract vehicles has been made much more visible to the public by the heavy reliance of
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56 Stephen L. Schooner, {Abu Ghraib piece, forthcoming ___Stanford Law and Policy J.__ (2004)}; Christopher Yukins & Mohab Khattab, Iraqi Construction Awards Should Not beImmune from Review, 80 FEDERAL CONTRACTS REPORT No. 18,  512-516 (Nov. 18, 2003); L.Elaine Halchin, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS,AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES (Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2004), at 15-23. 
57 M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1298-1299, 1300-1306 (D.C. Cir.1971); Shoals American Industries, Inc. v. United States, 877 F.2d 883, 888-889 (11th Cir. 1989). This standard of review, based on the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, nowhas been made applicable to bid protests heard in the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. §1491(b)(1) & (4).  See also infra TAN ___-___ (regarding the especially deferential standard ofreview to be applied in bid protests arising out of military procurement). 
58 455 F.2d at 1300-1306. 
59See infra TAN ___-___.
the United States on such instruments in the Iraq War of 2003-2004 and the rebuilding of Iraq.56An additional important example of exceptionalism in the law of public contractformation arguably is found in the deferential standard of review reflected in theScanwell/Steinthal doctrine, which allowed for judicial consideration of bid protests arising outof the award of a federal government contract.57  Adoption of this deferential approach wasconsidered appropriate because of the highly technical nature of the procurement policy issuesinvolved, as well as the complexity of the pertinent legal structure, and the greater expertise ofagency procurement officials, and of the General Accounting Office (an available nonjudicialprotest forum), as compared to that of a reviewing court, in addressing these technical matters.58 As is noted  in Part IIIC, this policy of deferential review is applied with special strength in thecontext of military procurement.59  Of course, one might question whether the labelexceptionalism fits properly here, as the procurement choices of non-governmental purchasersordinarily would not be subject to any judicial review.  Subjection of the government’s
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60See Cibinic & Nash, FORMATION, supra note 55, at 709-967; Nash, Schooner &O’Brien, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 55, at 107-108 (“CompetitiveProposals,” and “Competitive Range.”) 
procurement decisions to judicial review, in and of itself, may properly be considered amanifestation of reverse exceptionalism, which burdens the government and provides rights to awould-be contractor.  Adoption of the deferential standard of review for such judicial reviewproceedings may best be viewed, then, as an accommodation between the reverse exceptionalistvalues served by giving disappointed offerors the right to maintain a bid protest, and theexceptionalist policies that serve the needs of the government to be free of harmful and intrusivejudicial second-guessing of its procurement policy decisions. Other significant features of the federal procurement law governing contract formation,may likewise be best understood as seeking to reconcile the special obligations that thegovernment bears in the contract formation process with exceptionalist policies and concerns. Among these are rules and procedures superimposed upon the basic requirements of publiccontract formation (themselves designed to assure transparently and competitive procurement forthe benefit of contractors and the public, imposing obligations on government agencies) that aredesigned to afford procuring agencies additional flexibility in securing these objectives.  Salient in that category is the development of the process of competitive negotiation as analternative to sealed bidding as a procedure for undertaking open competitive procurement.60 Competitive negotiation is designed to allow transparent competitive procurement thatnonetheless affords agencies discretion to secure “best value” defined in terms of multiplecriteria, including qualitative measures in addition to price measures, rather than simply choosing
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62John Cibinic & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., COST REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTING (GeorgeWashington Univ. 2d ed. 1993), passim; Nash, Schooner & O’Brien,  GOVERNMENT CONTRACTSREFERENCE BOOK, supra note 55, at 146-147.
the lowest price bid.61  Another significant accommodationist doctrine with this character is the development ofthe cost-reimbursement contract.62 Cost reimbursement contracts  enable the government tocontract on flexible financial terms that would, to say the least, be unusual in private contracts. They are therefore appropriately regarded as exceptionalist accommodations.   Essentially, thegovernment agrees in advance to pay the contractor its audited cost of performance, plus a profitincrement.  Use of such flexible financial terms serves to allocate to the government theunacceptably high risk associated with the performance of certain government contracts, whichcall for cutting edge performances of unknown difficulty.    By allocating the risk thatperformance will be unexpectedly difficult and expensive to the government, the governmentseeks to induce contractors to make offers on work where the risks are too great to bid on a fixed-price basis, or where those offers would otherwise necessitate so large a risk premium built intothe fixed price as to make the contract more expensive than its actuarial cost.In addition to the foregoing, there are public procurement-related doctrines in the UnitedStates that defy ready categorization as bearing directly on contract formation, contractperformance, or on both, that nonetheless are marked by departure from the norms that governprivate contracts.   These rules also are not so readily classifiable as either exceptionalist in thepure sense defined here, or reverse exceptionalist in their operation.  A distinguishing feature of
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 40
63487 U.S. 500 (1988).
64See supra TAN ___-___.
65487 U.S. at 512.
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67487 U.S. at 504-509.
this group of government contract doctrines is that they bear most directly on the rights andimmunities of government contractors as against parties other than the federal government. Perhaps the leading example of such a rule, is the “government contractor defense”doctrine established by Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.63 Boyle, which grows ultimately outof the choice of law principles articulated in Clearfield Trust,64 establishes judge-made, federalcommon law defense for certain federal government contractors, applicable to state tort lawclaims brought against the contractor.  Boyle holds thatliability for . . . defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law,when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipmentconformed to those specifications; and (3) the [contractor] warned the United States aboutdangers in the use of the equipment that were know to the [contractor] but not to theUnited States.65Note as well, that this departure from the tort norms that would surround an ordinarily privatecontract arose in the context of military procurement and draws much of its rationale from thepolicy considerations that discourage courts aggressive second-guessing of military procurementdecisions.66  Note as well that the rationale for extending immunity to a contractor in thissituation is based on the desire to protect the interests and prerogatives of the federalgovernment.67  In that sense the government contractor defense fits properly within the bounds ofthe exceptionalist approach as defined here.
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 41
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A final example of this kind of exceptionalism is the derivative regulatory immunity(against state regulation) that extends to federal government contractors where the imposition ofstate regulation on the federal government contractor would interfere with federal procurementpolicies.68  Plainly, in this case as well, the purpose of extending immunity to the contractor is toprotect the interests and policies of the federal government from state interference.69
D. The Incidence of ExceptionalismThis Article has now defined the phenomenon of exceptionalism in public procurementlaw more precisely, distinguishing it from the reverse exceptionalism that characterizes much ofthe United States law of government contract formation.  The Article has also surveyed thewaterfront of significant examples of exceptionalism in settings pertaining to governmentcontract formation and government contract performance, as well as doctrines that cut across thiscategorization, or which exists outside its categories.  Based on this comprehensive survey, it isnow possible to assess the locus of the phenomenon of exceptionalism within the United Stateslaw of public contracts.  True exceptionalism is primarily manifested in the law of public contract performance,and only secondarily in the law of federal government contract formation and elsewhere ingovernment contracts law.  This is significant, inter alia, for comparative law purposes because it
Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04),  page 42
means that United States public procurement law is most strikingly exceptionalist with regard toaspects of the procurement law system, broadly defined, that are  not even considered an integral part of the public procurement law system of the European Community or the systems of manyEuropean and civil law countries, including, for instance, those of the United Kingdom andGermany.  Although a closer examination of the impact of the doctrines associated with“administrative contracts” in many civil law nations may ultimately significantly qualify thisconclusion, the pattern discerned here suggests a strong contrast between the procurement lawregime of the United States and those of many other nations.  In sum, where the United Statesemphasizes “exceptionalism” in the law of public contract performance, the dominant European law tendency emphasizes “congruence.”   In Part III of this Article we propose and evaluate anexplanation for this divergence: the unusually strong role that military procurement has played inthe development of the United States public procurement system and legal doctrine.
III. Exceptionalism and the Centrality of Military ProcurementIf we review the examples of exceptionalism noted in the previous section of this paper,and examine the genesis of these exceptional rules, including both examples among the rules thatgovern government contract performance and examples from the law of public contractformation, it is striking how often the leading cases involve military procurement.  Militaryprocurement disputes played a crucial role in the development of United States publicprocurement law as midwife facilitating the birth of a highly exceptionalist regime of publicprocurement law.  
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71 This is documented in the next two sections of this Article, Parts IIIB and IIIC. 
In this section of this paper we initially address a significant question about the methodfor presenting and demonstrating the power of this hypothesis.   Next comes a brief historicaloverview  designed to confirm the centrality of military procurement throughout the history ofthe United States’ procurement system.  Finally, we turn to the key point, the evidence of the keyrole played by military procurement in the emergence of an exceptionalist-oriented body ofpublic procurement law.
A. Comparative Analysis and a Note on Causation, Coincidence and MethodologyPerhaps this is as good a juncture as any to consider an important point that bearsimportantly on any assessment of the causal hypothesis explored here:  that military procurement–  and disputes and policy controversies arising therefrom –  played a distinctive and importantrole in the development of the exceptionalist thread in the United States’ law of publicprocurement.  To be sure, a comprehensive history of government procurement in the UnitedStates by James Nagle confidently asserts at the very threshold that “[m]ilitary contractscommand center stage in any history of government procurement.”70   Read in context, of course,it is reasonably clear that Jim Nagle’s assertion is meant to apply only to the history ofprocurement in the United States, which is, after all, the subject of his book.  Of course, it is alsotrue that, in the United States, regulation of defense and military procurement historically hasbeen at the center of development of the rules and procedures for procurement.71  The extension
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73Martin Trybus, “National Models for the Regulation of the Acquisition of Armaments:Toward a European Defence Procurement Code,” in Sue Arrowsmith & Arwel Davies, eds., PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: GLOBAL REVOLUTION (Kluwer Law Int’l, 1998), 71.   See also {MartinTrybus EUROPEAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MODELS FORA LIBERALISED DEFENCE PROCUREMENT MARKET (Kluwer Law Int’l, 1999), Ch. 1;   Arie Reich,INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW (Kluwer 1999), 200-201 (reporting some progressin extending EU Directives to cover non-military specific goods bought for military purposes;but otherwise military procurement remains exempt from the EU framework).Trybus notes that hard defense material was excluded from the application of the ECTreaty and the specialized EC procurement directives, at least in practice, by the broadinterpretation given the armaments exemption of Article 296(1)(b) of the EC Treaty by theMember States.  This broad interpretation of the Treaty’s armaments exception treated thatprovision as a categorical exclusion of all hard defense material from the application of theTreaty, dispensing with any requirement that application of the exemption be invoked andjustified in individual cases.  However, since the judgment of the European Court of Justice in{Case C-414/97, Commission v. Spain, [       ] ECR ________}, it is clear that Article 296(1)(b)of the EC Treaty will not be interpreted as a such a broad categorical exemption, and will need tobe specifically invoked and its application justified by the Member State seeking to bring itselfwithin application of the exception in a particular procurement. {Martin Trybus, “Procurementfor the Armed Forces: Balancing National Security with the Internal Market,” ___ European LawReview ____ (2000).} Although the broad interpretation of the armaments exclusion apparentlycontinues to prevail in the practice of European Community Member States, the wording of thearmaments exclusion in the new European Community Public Procurement Directive appears toaccommodate the narrower interpretation given the Treaty exclusion in Commission v. Spain.{quote/cite–Trybus?}
of a comprehensive framework for transparent regulated public procurement to most civilianprocurement, was in the United States, a comparatively recent innovation (traceable to 1965).72 By contrast, it is apparent that differing approaches have been taken in and within the EuropeanUnion.   For instance, Martin Trybus reported in his 1998 survey that in the European Union “hard defence equipment” was excluded  – at least in practice –  from the Community’s internalmarket and that accordingly there is no single market for hard defence equipment within the EUand national governments still assume  total control over this market.73  Moreover, he reports a
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74Id. at 76, 80, 82.  See {Laurence Folliot-Lalliot, French Public Contracts, forthcoming___West's International Government Contractor ___ (200x)} Part I, Chap. 1, Sec. 6 F (regardingprovisions of the new French Public Procurement Code permitting some defense contracts to beexcluded from the operation of the French Procurement Code where it is necessary to keep thecontract secret in the national interest; still coverage of military procurement under the Code isthe default norm).
75 Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any party from taking anyaction or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for theprotection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms,ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for nationalsecurity or for national defence purposes.Note the phrasing, which allows each government to be the judge of its own claim that it isnecessary for security or defense reasons to exempt such procurement from the operation of themultilateral open regime created by the GPA.  This language tracks a model employed, as well,in other international agreements, including the GATT, GATS and TRIPS agreements.{Citations.}
striking diversity of approaches among major EU nations in this regard, ranging from France,which applied a well-developed regulated approach to defense procurement, to Germany, whichapplies a “formal procurement regime with detailed rules” to defense procurement, but whichtreats these rules as “not generally enforceable,” all the way to the United Kingdom, which, hereports, follows an unregulated approach to defense procurement in which “defence contracts arenot awarded according to fixed and legally binding contract award procedures.”74  The WorldTrade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement provides in Article XXIII(1) a broadright to exclude military procurement from the operation of that regime.75  So regulation ofmilitary procurement is scarcely the norm in the advanced western economies.  Similarly,developing nations and those with economies somewhere in the transition from socialism to afreer market often choose to exclude military procurement from the coverage of newly adoptedprocurement law regimes as they move toward compliance with emerging international norms for
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77UNCITRAL Article 1(2); see Robert R. Hunja, “The UNCITRAL Model Law onProcurement of Goods, Construction and Services and Its Impact on Procurement Reform,” inSue Arrowsmith & Arwel Davies, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: GLOBAL REVOLUTION, supra note___, at 97, 99.  Robert Hunja’s chapter is presented by Arrowsmith and Davies in the section oftheir book devoted to public procurement reform in developing and transition economies. 
transparent and competitive procurement.76  Indeed the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Lawallows nations to exempt procurement affecting national security or defense from itsrequirements for competitive regulated procurement.77 Thus, despite the sometimes UnitedStates-centric perspective of legal observers on this, western, side of the Atlantic, it should not beassumed that the creation of a procurement law regime on a template designed to accommodatemilitary procurement somehow reflects a universal constant or an international norm.Still, even if the development of a procurement law that grew up around the needs ofmilitary procurement is somewhat remarkable, viewed in comparative and historical perspective,it is necessary to consider the alternative possibility that the salience of military procurement inthe cases that establish and define the exceptionalist character of much of United States’ public
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procurement law regime is largely a coincidence or historical artifact, rather than a distinctivecause of the emergence of that exceptionalist tendency in the procurement law of the UnitedStates.  Indeed, precisely because so much of the procurement in the early years of the UnitedStates’ history was military procurement, disputes arising in those cases were disproportionatelylikely to have become the vehicle for deciding points of law that might equally apply in non-military contexts.   This might well have been so even if the fact that the test cases arose frommilitary procurement made no other difference to the outcome of the cases.  The methodologicaldifficulty is compounded by the fact that there plainly is no direct way to test how the characterof United States procurement law might have emerged differently had it not engrossed militaryprocurement within its coverage.   As previously indicated, one way of evaluating the alternative “coincidence” hypothesiswould be to examine the procurement law of other nations to try to confirm the causal connectionbetween coverage of military procurement in a nation’s procurement law regime, and thetendency to reflect what is labeled here as an exceptionalist approach.  Understandably, a fullcomparative law analysis that could confirm or disprove my hypothesis in this manner is wellbeyond the scope of the present paper.  On the other hand, it is my hope that, armed with themodel and the basis for comparison established here, others will undertake, either on a countryspecific, or a multi-nation basis, the examination suggested here of the link between regulation ofmilitary procurement and the emergence of a strong exceptionalist tendency within a particularprocurement law regime.  Thus, ultimately, the materials necessary for undertaking a rigorous,powerful and comprehensive comparative analysis on this point will be assembled.   The author
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looks forward to returning to this subject as others have added to the corpus of materialsavailable for examining this hypothesis in comparative perspective.For the present, however, the task of this article is pursued differently.  The methodemployed here, which focuses on the internal analysis of the operation and history of the UnitedStates’ procurement law regime,  is to demonstrate through careful analysis of seminal cases inwhich exceptionalist doctrines emerged, the important role played by military procurement andits regulation in the United States.  More specifically, to counter the alternative “coincidence”hypothesis noted above, it will be helpful to demonstrate that the exceptionalist doctrines weredeveloped, to a strikingly disproportionate degree, in cases involving military procurement.  Butit will be equally, if not more important, to demonstrate that the military procurement context andthe compelling special policies that arise in that context contributed powerfully to the rationalesgiven for the decisions rendered in developing those exceptionalist doctrines.  That is thechallenge undertaken here. 
B. Centrality of Military Procurement in the United StatesJust as this work cannot provide a comprehensive account of all of the doctrinal contoursof United States public procurement law without inflating into the proportions of a treatise, sotoo, it cannot stand on its own as a history of the development of the public procurement systemin the United States.78  Fortunately for the author, and for the reader, Jim Nagle has provided uswith a fine history of that system, updated in 1999, that serves us well, in drawing conclusions
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about the overall character of the United States’ procurement system and the role of militaryprocurement therein.79As Nagle has concluded, “[m]ilitary contracts command central stage in any history ofgovernment procurement” in the United States.80  And military contracting does indeed commandthe center of the stage in his valuable history of United States federal public contracting.  Thechapters of his work are structured to a substantial degree around successive eras of combat,commencing in the pre-Revolutionary era with the French and Indian War, moving on theRevolutionary War, followed by the War of 1812, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War andWorld War I, and on to World War II, and finally to the post-war era.  Nor are these just handychronological units.  An immersion in the historical materials such as that undertaken by Naglereveals that the war eras thrust striking and new challenges on the United States that producedinnovative responses in the management and regulation of public procurement.  Some of theissues changed over time  in different eras, but it remained true that military procurement wastypically the main engine that drove forward the development of what gradually became asophisticated system of regulated public procurement.  In the early history of the United States,moreover, military procurement formed the heart of public procurement.  It also drove thebeginnings of efforts systematically to regulate public procurement and the earliest efforts tobegin to create a norm of open competition and transparency.  At each successive stage of thedevelopment of federal government contracting practice  and of its regulation, military
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procurement was at the forefront of challenge and of innovation.  Nor was the salience of military procurement merely a historical constant.  Rather, as Nagle demonstrates, the themes, debates, and problems that recur throughout  the history ofUnited States public procurement, are predominantly ones that emerge characteristically frommilitary procurement, or which emphasize its role.  These include, significantly:• the mixed blessings associated with the emergence and power of a “military-industrialcomplex,” • the problems of  “profiteering “ and excessive profits in the shortage conditions of wartime, • the debates over the nationalization alternative to government contracting that take onparticular force in the presence of war time profit opportunities for contractors, • the ethical challenges aggravated by “revolving doors” and blending of private and publicinterests and roles, between government and its contractors in private industry, whichswing all the more rapidly in war time and in its aftermath, • and, finally, the special need for and the special difficulty of achieving meaningfulcompetition when faced with the exigencies of mobilization for war or comparablenational crises.81  Nagle’s survey also shows that military contracting has been at the heart of the procedural storyof government contracting over the years.  He asserts: “Much of the country’s contracting historyhas been spent trying to find the best combination of three factors: the right contracting
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84 See, e.g. id. at 4-5, 57-60, 151-163, 168-170, 361-377.
apparatus, the right government-contractor relationship, and the correct contract form itself.”82  The history he recounts, selectively noted below, shows that military procurement typically wasat the forefront of development in each of these areas.  In sum, at every stage of publicprocurement history, military procurement was at the heart of the most contentious issues as wellas the most innovative solutions. Of course, Nagle acknowledges that “[f]ocusing” entirely “on wars and the militarywould overlook a tremendous source of history.”83 Specifically, Nagle acknowledges that indifferent eras of United States history civilian agencies engaged in development of essential newinfrastructure such as the Post Office Department and, later, the Bureau of Reclamation with itsprogram of dam construction, contributed substantially to the practice of governmentcontracting.84  Still, it would require a willful blindness to the main currents of United Stateshistory to miss the fact that military and defense contracting has played the central role indevelopment of both the United States system of public procurement and the development of  aregulatory structure therefor.  It is striking, moreover, that even the civilian examples offered byNagle generally reflect critical and extraordinary national efforts, essential to the development ofthe new nation, and to further progress in succeeding eras, that confronted the United States withchallenges (and opportunities for technical, managerial, and legal innovation) comparable inscope and importance to those presented by the exigencies of war time.  Thus in recent eras we
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can think of the challenge of getting astronauts to stand on the moon, or some of the recentnational security tasks arising in the wake of the terrorist attack of 9/11/2001.   (The latter, ofcourse, may in fact be considered, a part of, rather than a counter to, the pre-eminence of militaryand defense tasks in the development of public procurement in the United States.)   In summaryoverview then, the largest part of the story of United States procurement and public procurementlaw then, has been the development of military procurement and a legal framework for militaryprocurement, followed by the gradual extension of the norms of military public contracting to theentire field of federal public contracting.Fortunately, the propositions suggested here about the centrality of military procurementin the development of the United States’ system are borne out by common sense and commonknowledge.  They may, indeed, strike some readers as too obvious to warrant discussion orelaborate proof.  In any event, any comprehensive  historical demonstration of the central roleplayed by military procurement in the development of the United States’ procurement system isnecessarily beyond the scope of this article, or any article.85  Relying heavily on Nagle’s usefultreatment, however, we can confidently conclude that military procurement has played a criticalrole in the development and evolution of the federal public procurement regime of in the UnitedStates.   Moreover, this point is tellingly corroborated in the next section of this Article, whichsurveys the role of military procurement in the emergence of significant exceptionalist doctrinesof procurement law.
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C. Military Procurement and ExceptionalismIn Part II of this Article, the author surveyed the public procurement law of the UnitedStates in order to more rigorously to define and demonstrate the strongly exceptionalist characterof that body of law.    It was demonstrted, as well, that exceptionalism, as it has been definedhere, is significantly, but not exclusively, concentrated in the law governing performance offederal public contracts as opposed to the law of federal government contract formation.  In theprocess of carrying out that doctrinal survey much evidence was adduced that will support theother branch of the author’s thesis: that the salience of military procurement in the developmentof the United States public procurement law regime has been a very substantial cause of theemergence of the exceptionalist flavor of that body of procurement law.  As is moresystematically demonstrated in this last portion of this Article, the strikingly importance of themilitary role  is reflected in exceptionalist doctrines pertaining to contract formation as well asthose pertaining to contract performance, and also in some doctrines that affect both areas orwhich defy ready categorization into either category.  As in Part II of this Article, limitations of space make it necessary to be selective here. This can be neither a comprehensive historical account, nor a complete doctrinal survey ofUnited States public procurement law.  As a result, fuller accounts are offered of thedevelopment of some of the most significant exceptionalist rules of United States publicprocurement law, designed to test the hypothesis that military procurement has been a majordriver of the exceptionalist character of the system.   Some of the most telling examples areconsidered in this fashion, with other exceptionalist features of this body of law treated more
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summarily.  Although this survey generally bears out the claim made here about the criticalimportance of the inclusion of military procurement in explaining the exceptionalist character ofthe body of United States public procurement law, some of the examples considered demonstratethat the true picture is somewhat more complex.  The willingness of United States courts andlegislators to recognize overriding considerations that justify departures from the norm ofcongruence generally, and from specific rules of private contract law, is strongly correlated withthe role of military procurement.  Recognition of overriding prerogatives for the sovereign ascontractor has been accentuated and potentiated by the consideration of disputes and policyissues arising in the setting of military procurement.  Although military procurement has thuscatalyzed the emergence of exceptionalism in United States public procurement law, the selectivesurvey presented here also demonstrates that recognition of special sovereign prerogatives hasnot be limited to the sphere of military procurement.  In some instances, such as the terminationfor convenience doctrine, the special latitude initially granted to the government in a militarysetting has come to transcend that setting.  In other instances, such as the sovereign acts andunmistakability doctrine, the compelling needs of military activities illustrate, but do not limit orfully define the scope of the overriding sovereign priorities whose recognition producedstrikingly exceptionalist rules for federal public procurement.Of course, the selective approach taken here invites other scholars to flesh out the workbegun here with more detailed study of additional exceptionalist elements in the body of UnitedStates public procurement law, as well as to search further for congruence-oriented elements ofthe corpus of public procurement law that emerged despite the influence of military procurement
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8791 U.S. 321 (1875).  It appears that earlier in the development of federal publiccontracts law such cases were more common than they have become in recent years and played amore significant role on the Supreme Court docket.  The Supreme Court thus played a morecentral and less interstitial role in the development of public contract law in this early formativeperiod. The author  hesitates even to label Corliss Steam-Engine Co. a case about “publiccontracts law” proper, for the lawfulness of the practice of termination for convenience wasassumed, rather than decided in the case, strictly speaking; the questions squarely presented inCorliss Steam-Engine Co. related only to the authority of federal government officials to enterinto binding contracts on behalf of the United States.  Still the language of the case is sosweeping that the case has assumed precedential significance, and is widely regarded asestablishing the lawfulness of a broad reservation authority to terminate a federal public contractfor the convenience of the government, at least in a military setting.
on the system.   In addition, of course, as previously noted, it is hoped that the present study willencourage other scholars to test the hypothesis articulated here against the history and doctrine ofgovernment procurement law regimes in other nations and in transnational legal orders.1. Termination for ConvenienceThe development of the United States’ government’s broad power of termination forconvenience over its public contracts offers a paradigmatic example of the role that militaryprocurement has played in the emergence of the strongly exceptionalist elements in the UnitedStates’ public procurement law.86  Our legal story begins with one of the relatively unusual foraysof the Supreme Court of the United States into the area of public contracts and related legalissues, the 1875 decision of the Court in United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co.87 In Corliss, the United States Navy Department had entered into contracts with theplaintiff during the Civil War for the manufacture of certain machinery that the Navy expected toemploy in the prosecution of the war effort.  As the Court tells it, “[t]he completion of the
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89The contractor offered either to keep the partially manufactured machinery and apayment of $150,000, or to deliver the incomplete equipment to the government coupled with apayment to it of $259,068.  Id. at 321. 
90Id. at 322.  Note that this stipulation, which follows the model of what today would becalled a “funds available,” “funds availability” or “availability of funds” clause generally isnecessary, even today,  whenever the funds called for by a contract exceed availableappropriations, to avoid a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(B).   See,e.g. C.H. Leavell & Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 878 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (interpreting a fundsavailability clause); 48 C.F.R. § 32.705-1(a) (mandating Availability of Funds Clause); 48 C.F.R.§ 52.232-18 (prescribing language for Availability of Funds Clause.)Even absent the clause from a contract, the Appropriations Clause of the United States
machinery contracted for having become unnecessary from the termination of the war, thesecretary [of the Navy], in the exercise of his judgment, under the advice of a board of navaladvisers, suspended the work.”88  Although the Court used the term suspension, there wasnothing temporary about the administrative action terminating a contract that by then had beenpartially performed by the contractor.   The contractor did not formally contest the lawfulness ofthe termination, eschewing any argument that the termination effected a breach of its originalcontract, but instead offered the government alternative proposals to settle the obligation of thegovernment for the work that had been done.89  The government accepted one of the contractor’ssuggestions for terms of a settlement and agreed to the sum to be paid the contractor.  However,because the Navy did not then have sufficient appropriated funds on hand to pay the full amountof the settlement agreement, it stipulated therein that only partial payment would be madeimmediately upon delivery of the partially completed equipment, with further payments to bemade when, and only if, further appropriations covering this obligation became available fromCongress.90  
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Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, cl.7, would raise a bar to payment not covered by a valid andapplicable statutory appropriation. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,424-434 (1990).  However, if funds did not become available and such a clause were absent fromthe contract, the United States would be left in the posture of breaching its contract with noremedy available to the contractor.  The funds availability clause thus makes transparent thegovernment’s exceptional defense to payment on its contracts arising from the AppropriationsClause by warning the contractor of the salient pre-condition that limits the government’sundertaking to pay its obligation.  Of course, one might think that the very idea of conditioning the government’sundertaking to pay on the discretionary decision of a future Congress to appropriate funds wouldrender the contract illusory, but this has never been the law.  As a private contracting partyalmost certainly could not so condition its obligation to pay so broadly without rendering itscontract unenforceable, the complex of doctrines associated with the Appropriations Clause, theAnti-Deficiency Act, and Funds Availability Clauses reflects a significant exceptionalist elementin federal public contracts law.  It affects both the formation and performance of such federalpublic contracts.
91Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. at 321.  Apparently, moreover, the necessary fundswere appropriated because the government did not defend its non-payment by relying on theFunds Availability Clause that had been inserted in the settlement agreement.
The machinery was delivered in accordance with this settlement agreement, but thecontractor found it necessary to sue the government for damages in the Court of Claims torecover the compensation owing under the settlement agreement91  The issue raised on appealbefore the Supreme Court was whether the Secretary of the Navy had the requisite authority toenter into a binding contract of settlement with the contractor in this situation.  Arguing aposition that would have disserved the government’s long-run interests in establishing itsprocurement authority and general power to contract, the government defended its refusal to pay, asserting that authority was lacking to enter into a binding agreement of this kind.  Fortunately,the government lost this battle, thereby winning “the war” and establishing both the broadauthority of executive branch agencies to enter into binding contracts, for procurement as well asfor settlement of procurement disputes, as well as the legitimacy of the practice of termination for
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convenience, at least in this military context.The Court’s language is emphatic, and unqualified, making clear the importance of themilitary context to the result reached.  In deciding the question of authority to contract, the Courtnoted both the generic grant of authority to the Navy Department to procure naval stores andequipment, and the more specific grants of statutory authority and legislative appropriations formaking such purchases specifically for the prosecution of the Civil War to put down “therebellion.”92 This authority was vested in the Secretary of the Navy, moreover, under thedirection of the President, and it extended not only to “enter[ing]” into procurement “contractsfor public service,” initially, but also to suspending such contracts, where appropriate, andentering into binding contracts of settlement resulting from such terminations:93  “As, in makingthe original contracts, he must agree upon the compensation to be made for their entireperformance, it would seem, that, when those contracts are suspended by him, he must be equallyauthorized to agree upon the compensation for their partial performance.”94  It seems fair toconclude that the military context, and the obvious necessity for this kind of exercise of thecontracting power, helped to persuade the Court that the statutory power to contract existed here.The Court explained:the discharge of the duty devolving on the secretary [of the Navy] necessarily requireshim to enter into numerous contracts for public service; and the power to suspend workcontracted for, whether in the construction, armament, or equipment of vessels of war,when from any cause the public interest requires such suspension, must necessarily rest
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95Id. at 322.   A generation before Corliss Steam-Engine Co., in United States v. Tingey,30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115 (1831), the Supreme Court had decided that the United States has theinherent power to enter into contracts in order to carry out its constitutional responsibilities andits other powers, notwithstanding the absence of a textual grant of the authority to enter contractsin the Constitution and the absence of an express statutory grant of that power.  That case, likeCorliss Steam-Engine Co., arose out of a contract in a military setting– a fidelity bond that LewisDeblois was required to post as a condition of his holding office as a Navy purser.   The Courtstrongly affirmed that “the United States have such a capacity to  enter into contracts,” thatauthority being  an incident to the general right of sovereignty; and the United States being a body politic,may, within the sphere of the constitutional powers confided to it, and through theinstrumentality of the proper department to which those powers are confided, enter intocontracts not prohibited by law, and appropriate to the just exercise of those powers.  . . .  To adopt a different principle, would be to deny the ordinary rights of sovereignty . . . .30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 128.  Unlike Corliss Steam-Engine Co., the Court’s opinion in Tingey does notpermit us to conclude that the military setting was critical to the outcome.  Even so, however,because of the pre-eminence of military contracting in the activities of the United States in theearly post-constitutional period, it is not accidental that the seminal case about the federalgovernment’s constitutional and statutory power to contract arose from a dispute about amundane bond contract in a military context. Although Tingey takes an expansive view of federal power in the area of contracting,extending that power beyond the literal limits of the applicable constitutional and statutory texts,it also could be said to reflect a significant and distinctive application of a congruence-orientedapproach, rather than an exceptionalist approach.  Specifically, the Court infers that the federalgovernment possesses a power and capacity that ordinary natural persons enjoy: an inherentpower to enter into contracts.  In the constitutional setting of the case, the arguably germane“exceptional” distinguishing feature of the federal government was its status as a government oflimited powers, expressly delegated.  Tingey thus enhances federal government power byemploying a formally congruence-oriented approach. 
with him.95But if the military context is only subtly invoked as a factor in the Court’s analysis of the powerof the Secretary to enter into binding contracts (both generally, and specifically, as to terminationsettlement contracts), the importance of the military context is declared in ringing tones, withrespect to the question of the legitimacy of a termination for convenience:
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Contracts for the armament and equipment of vessels of war may, and generally do,require numerous modifications in the progress of the work, where that work requiresyears for its completion. With the improvements constantly made in ship-building andsteam-machinery and in arms, some parts originally contracted for may have to beabandoned, and other parts substituted; and it would be of serious detriment to the publicservice if the power of the head of the Navy Department did not extend to providing forall such possible contingencies by modification or suspension of the contracts, andsettlement with the contractors.96
This is a forceful seminal statement of the factors that have made military procurement and thedisputes and policy matters arising therefrom an engine for the development of exceptionalism inthe law of federal government procurement in the United States.  The legitimacy of thegovernment’s revising of its contractual commitments was considered obvious both because ofthe inherently uncertain changing fortunes of war, and because of the technically progressivenature of the production of military equipment.  Indeed, the latter rationale appears to haveentailed a pioneering  judicial recognition of the special nature of what we might today call hightechnology procurement.  In addition to these two factors that explain much of the recurringcontribution of military procurement to the development of exceptionalist procurement lawdoctrine, a third reason for taking this highly exceptionalist approach is more subtly  reflected inthe Court’s opinion, as well. That additional factor, also a recurring motif of the exceptionalistcases and doctrines arising from military procurement, is the important value of deferring to theexpert judgment of those charged by law with making decisions regarding military matters.  TheCourt explained that, the “completion of the machinery contracted for having becomeunnecessary from the termination of the war, the secretary, in the exercise of his judgment, under
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98 Note that the influential decision in Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840),reflects the powerful reluctance of the courts, in the nineteenth century, to allow judicial revieweven of ministerial administrative action.  The Court declared emphatically:The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executivedepartments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we arequite satisfied that, that such a power was never intended to be given to them.Id. at 516.  The remarkable fact is that the executive action so zealously guarded againstmischievous judicial review by the Decatur Court, was the failure to pay a widow’s pensiongranted by statute, and judicial review did not appear in this context particularly likely to trenchupon sensitive executive judgments.  However, the case involved a claim to a military widow’spension;  the claimant was in fact the widow of early American naval hero, Stephen Decatur. The Decatur Court’s seemingly inexplicable overstatement of the dangers of opening the door tojudicial review may well reflect the special reluctance to question executive judgments incontexts even weakly related to military concerns, that we see as well in the 1831 decision inTingey and the 1875 decision in Corliss Steam-Engine..
99249 U.S. 313 (1919).
the advice of a board of naval officers, suspended the work.”97  This early invocation ofprinciples we might today call deferential review appears to have drawn part of its force from theCourt’s unquestioning assumption that it was especially unqualified to second-guess theassessment by the military officials as to the changed circumstances that they had determinedwere sufficient to warrant termination of the contract.98
Corliss Steam-Engine Co. thus testifies powerfully to the particularized impact of themilitary context of procurement on the development of exceptionalist doctrine.  But this point iscast in more striking relief when we compare Corliss with the decision a mere 44 years later inUnited States v. Purcell Envelope Co.99  Purcell Envelope establishes, in effect, one of theleading congruence-influenced doctrines concerning federal government contract formation: that
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a contractor’s offer, coupled with an acceptance effectuated by a governmental officialpossessing the requisite authority results in a contract binding on the United States.100  The casearose when the Post Office Department solicited bids for a requirements contract to supply itwith stamped envelopes for a four year term.  Although the government had accepted Purcell’sbid after having determined that it met applicable standards of responsibility, it subsequentlyattempted to revoke that acceptance and cancel the contract.   The attempted revocation occurredafter a new Postmaster General took office and in response to the unfavorable results of areinvestigation of Purcell’s financial soundness that had been ordered by the new Postmasterupon his assuming his office.   In holding that the government was bound by its acceptance ofPurcell’s offer, the Court rejected the government’s argument that the new Postmaster Generalhad a “quasi-judicial” power “to review and set aside the decision of his predecessor, 101declaring that offer and acceptance yielded a binding contract:
We are unable to concede the fact or the power asserted to be dependent upon it. Theremust be a point of time at which discretion is exhausted. The procedure for theadvertising for bids for supplies or services to the Government would else be a mockery -- a procedure, we may say, that is not permissive but required (§ 3709, Rev. Stats.). By itthe Government is given the benefit of the competition of the market and each bidder isgiven the chance for a bargain. It is a provision, therefore, in the interest of bothGovernment and bidder, necessarily giving rights to both and placing obligations on both.And it is not out of place to say that the Government should be animated by a justice asanxious to consider the rights of the bidder as to insist upon its own. And,  we repeat,there must be some point at which discretion ceases and obligation takes its place. . . . .Upon the invitation, in accordance with law, of Postmaster General Gary, the EnvelopeCompany and eleven others submitted bids. The Envelope Company was the lowestbidder and after the Company had been found upon investigation to be financially
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104If the acceptance had not been effectuated by an official with actual authority to bindthe United States, then exceptionalism would have come in to play in the form of thegovernment’s immunity from equitable estoppel, and the related rule that an exercise of apparentauthority does not bind the United States. See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
responsible its bid was accepted by entry of a formal order.102
The Purcell Court, in a routine civilian procurement, can find no reason to depart from theprivate law regime in which an acceptance of an offer yields a binding contract.  Indeed, theCourt lectures the government as to why the competitive mechanisms of governmentprocurement make it all the more important that the government was bound by its acceptance.  Thus Purcell reflects congruence, compounded with the “positive exceptionalism,” previouslynoted, that imposes extra obligations on the government in favor of its contractors, especially inthe contract formation process.103  In this routine civilian procurement contract setting, despitethe adverse results of the new Postmaster General’s intervening re-investigation of thecontractor’s financial standing and responsibility, the Court is unwilling or unable to recognizeany legally sufficient basis for allowing , to allow the government the power to revise or avoid itscontracts.104
Although the contrast between any two cases may, of course, be misleading, or explained byother factors, the dramatically opposed approaches taken in Corliss Steam-Engine Co. and inPurcell Envelope is strong evidence of the distinctive impact of the military procurement contexton the the development of exceptionalism in United States public procurement law.
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105681 F.2d 756 (1982).  Although Torncello has been superseded as precedent byKrygoski Construction Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520U.S. 1210 (1997), Judge Bennett’s opinion for the court in Torncello remains a uniquely carefulrecord of the history of the development of the termination for convenience doctrine, and animportant sign post as to its proper scope.  It is also true that Judge Bennett’s opinion for the 6member court was substantially undermined, both by Judges Davis and Nichols, who concurredonly in the judgment in Torncello, and by the separate opinion of Judge Friedman. Torncello,681 F.2d at 773-774.  As the Krygoski court subsequently noted (94 F.3d at 1541-1542 & n.1),Judge Friedman’s opinion, formally designated a concurring opinion, rather than one concurringonly in the judgment, nonetheless reads more like the latter; on this basis the Krygoski courtquestioned whether Judge Bennett’s opinion in Torncello may properly be considered a majorityopinion for the court.  Nevertheless, nothing in Krygoski impeaches Judge Bennett’s historicalaccount of the evolution of termination for convenience, which is its only relevance for presentpurposes.  Indeed, Krygoski independently underscores the key role played by militaryprocurement in the development of the termination for convenience doctrine. 94. F.3d at 1540-1541.
106See supra TAN ___-___.
107681 F.2d at 764-765.
108Id. at 766.
The powerful impact of the military setting of the seminal termination for conveniencecase, explaining the expansive reception given to this assertion of authority there is furthercorroborated by the important opinion of the Court of Federal Claims in Torncello v. UnitedStates,105 noted previously.106  Judge Bennett’s exhaustive opinion emphasizes that thetermination for convenience doctrine was invented in the context of military procurement, waslimited, for 75 years, to war-time military procurement, and was not applied to civilianprocurement for almost a century.107   As Judge Bennett explained: “From the Corliss decision in1876 to the last use of the World War II convenience termination clause in early 1944, the legalbasis of the government's power had always been that the great and unpredictable circumstancesof war necessitated some ability to halt useless contracts and settle with the contractors.” 108 
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109Id.  It is this requirement of an objective change in the circumstances that has beenrevised by the subsequent decision in Krygoski (see supra note ____), which applies a moreexpansive formulation as to the proper availability of termination for convenience. 
110See supra notes 83 & 87. 
11194 F.3d at 1544.
Moreover, when the doctrine was expanded to apply to civilian and peacetime militaryprocurement, it was allowed a more narrower scope.   Despite the broader literal scope ofcontractual termination for convenience clauses, when “[w]ar was . . .  absent” from the situation,the Court of Claims  “allow[ed] termination for convenience only when” there was someunforeseeable objective “change in the circumstances” that departed from the “expectations ofthe parties” to the contract.109  It is only with the 1996 decision of the Federal Circuit in Krygoskithat a differential approach to termination for convenience in military and civilian cases appearsto have been abandoned.110 Even today, under the deferential “abuse of discretion” testarticulated in Krygoski111, it is likely that an abuse of discretion in instituting termination forconvenience is less likely to be found in a military procurement case than in a civilian one.  Thepolicy considerations given in Corliss Steam-Engine Co. have retained their force: thechangeability of the military needs on the demand side, the technical progressiveness of many ofthe objects of military procurement that drives changing specifications and needs on the supplyside, and the understandable inclination of civilian judges to defer strongly to expert militaryjudgments.  As we shall see, these factors have application in many contexts outside thetermination for convenience doctrine, driving the exceptionalist approach taken by the courts andpolicymakers. 
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114G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 419 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965).
2.  The G.L. Christian DoctrineA second illustration of an exceptionalist doctrine that suggests the impact of militaryprocurement on the development of the exceptionalist character in United States publicprocurement law is the G.L. Christian doctrine.112  As noted above, that doctrine teaches thatstandardized government contracts clauses that should have been included in a federalprocurement contract under the applicable regulations, but which were omitted from the contractbecause of human error, should nonetheless be read into any contracts from which the languagewas mistakenly omitted.113  The clause that was mistakenly omitted in G.L. Christian, theseminal case, was, moreover, the required termination for convenience clause.  The attemptedtermination for convenience was of a contract to construct a large military housing complex atFort Polk, Louisiana.  The termination was prompted by a decision to deactivate Fort Polk itselfas a result of the reassessment of the nation’s military needs and the best way in which to allocatelimited resources to serve those needs.114  The Court was emphatic about the importance of thegovernment’s right of termination for convenience in the context of military contracts of thiskind, and did not hesitate to conclude that the missing contractual clause should be read into the
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115The Court of Claims explained in considerable detail (312 F.2d at 426-427; citationsand footnote omitted):We are not, and should not be, slow to find the standard termination articleincorporated, as a matter of law, into plaintiff's contract . . . . The terminationclause limits profit to work actually done, and prohibits the recovery ofanticipated but unearned profits. That limitation is a deeply ingrained strand ofpublic procurement policy. Regularly since World War I, it has been a majorgovernment principle, in times of stress or increased military procurement, toprovide for the cancellation of defense contracts when they are no longer needed,as well as for the reimbursement of costs actually incurred before cancellation,plus a reasonable profit on that work -- but not to allow anticipated profits. InWorld War I, there was the Act of June 15, 1917. 40 Stat. 182, and the Dent Actof 1919, 40 Stat. 1272, both of which were held to prevent awards of prospectiveor possible profits.  In World War II, the termination provisions used by the warcontracting agencies (at least since late 1941) uniformly disallowed anticipatedprofits. The same policy against unearned profits was embodied in the ContractSettlement Act (Act of July 1, 1944, 58 Stat. 649), Section 6(d)(5) of whichdirected war contracting agencies, in settling terminated contracts, to award "suchallowance for profit on the preparations made and work done for terminatedportions of the war contract as is reasonable under the circumstances"; theregulation issued by the Office of Contract Settlement specifically limited profit topreparations made and work done (32 C.F.R., 1944 Supp., Sec. 8006.3(c), p.3065). Similarly, the Lucas Act of August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 902, authorizing thedepartments and agencies "to consider, adjust, and settle equitable claims ofcontractors," limited the amount of the claim to "losses (not including diminutionof anticipated profits) incurred * * *." Since World War II, the standardtermination clauses promulgated by the Defense Department and its constituentagencies have taken the same tack. Literally thousands of defense contracts andsubcontracts have been settled on that basis in the past decades.This history shows, in our view, that the Defense Department and the Congress would be loath to sanction a large contract which did not provide for power to terminateand at the same time proscribe anticipated profits if termination did occur.  Particularly inthe field of military housing, tied as it is to changes and uncertainties in installations,would it be necessary to take account of a possible termination in advance of completion,and to guard against a common law measure of recovery which had been disallowed forso many years in military procurement.
contract.115  The rationale for the court’s decision, set out in the margin, fairly shouts out thecritical role played by the military procurement context.  Moreover, the court was equally clear
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118 It does not appear that limitation of the doctrine to the military procurement contextwas ever seriously urged or considered.  But this does not undercut the argument made here;rather it demonstrates the degree to which military procurement cases have formed the templatefor the development of generic public procurement law doctrine in the United States. 
119See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
that the military context established that it was reasonable to charge the contractor withknowledge of the government’s conventional right to terminate for convenience, because of itsstatus as an “experienced contractor” on projects of this kind.116  Today the G..L. Christiandoctrine is regarded as a bright-line rule applicable to all federal government procurementcontracts.117  But there can be little doubt that the military procurement context played at least therole of  midwife–if not the role of father or mother– in the birth of this rule.  This then is a case inwhich a case arising out of military procurement and the special policies applicable theretocatalyzed the emergence of an exceptionalist doctrine that was given application even outside itsoriginal military procurement context.118 3. The Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability DoctrinesThe development of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine provides a third, albeit subtler,illustration of the influence of disputes and cases arising out of military procurement on theemergence of a powerful exceptionalist norm in United States public procurement law.119  Thepresent author has previously written at considerable length, describing the evolution of that
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121E.g. Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865), appeal dismissed, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)145 (1870); Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383 (1865).
122Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925).
123 Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5, at {175-176};Schwartz, Assembling Winstar , supra note 1, at ___.
doctrine and only the highlights need be rehearsed here.120   Briefly, the sovereign acts doctrineoperates to excuse the government of the United States from breach of contract liability where“public and general” acts undertaken in the performance of its sovereign responsibilities mightotherwise constitute a breach of contract.  Cases decided under the doctrine include ones wherethe government has acted in a manner that burdens or magnifies the contractual obligations of thegovernment’s contracting partner, the contractor.121  But they also include cases in which thegovernment has acted directly to repudiate its own promise of performance.122  The Sovereign Acts Doctrine’s operation often can be understood as that of a canon ofinterpretation for government contracts.123  So viewed, it is a canon that dictates that neither thegovernment’s express undertakings nor its implied obligations to cooperate with its contractorsshould be construed to make promises so unconditional that they are not subject to beingsuperseded by public and general governmental actions that might, of necessity, have theincidental effect of undercutting the contract.  Read as a canon of contractual interpretation, thispresumption is subject to being overcome by contractual language that is sufficiently clear and
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125 This formulation of the sovereign acts doctrine as a rebuttable canon of construction tobe used in interpreting government contracts the performance of which is adversely impacted bysubsequent public and general acts of the government, highlights the near identity of purpose andeffect between this doctrine and he historically distinct unmistakability and reserved powersdoctrines.  The present author has discussed this overlap in Liability for Sovereign Acts, supranote 1, at ___, and the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to recognize this overlap in AssemblingWinstar, supra note 1, at ____, and in Wake of Winstar, supra note 1 at ____.  
126 Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1,  at ___; Schwartz, Wake of Winstar,supra note 1,  at ____; Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5, at{175-176}.
unmistakable to override the presumption.124  So viewed, the sovereign acts doctrine may best beunderstood as a canon of avoidance that enables a court to avoid the conclusion that thegovernment’s sovereign duties and its contractual undertakings have come into irreconcilable conflict.125  On the other hand, in some contexts and in some applications the doctrine cannoteasily be understood as a canon of construction of the government’s bargain, and may better beviewed as simply excusing what would otherwise be a culpable breach.126  Without recapitulatingall of the nuances of this doctrine and its development, it is worthwhile here to note some keyfeatures of the two cases (Deming and Jones) in which the doctrine was devised by the UnitedStates Court of Claims, predecessor to today’s Court of Federal Claims, and the Horowitzdecision, in which the Supreme Court subsequently put its imprimatur on the doctrine.   The factsof these cases show that the court were more readily able to understand the need to protectsovereign authority against contractual infringement in these cases because of the militaryprocurement context and related contexts that made protection of sovereign authority aparticularly compelling value in the cases.   Once again, the special strength of sovereign
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prerogatives in contexts related to military needs and decision-making, and the reluctance of thecourts to second guess authorized military decision-makers was a powerful influence on theoutcome.  On the other hand, these cases also show that the courts recognized that strongprotection of sovereign power included, but was not limited to, the context of militaryprocurement.  There were other contexts in which the claims of sovereignty were regarded ascomparably strong, or nearly so.  Still, a balanced assessment of the legacy of these cases willshow the strong impact of military procurement in engendering the flexible jurisprudence of ourexceptionalist body of public procurement law.  Moreover, we shall see that recent cases inwhich the Supreme Court at least arguably has taken a somewhat more restrictive approach to theSovereign Acts Doctrine and/or the related Unmistakbility Doctrine have arisen in civilian andregulatory contracting contexts which, the Court perceived there to be no comparably compellingneed to protect the exercise of sovereign authority.   So here military procurement and protectionof military decision-makers plainly assisted at the birth of the exceptionalist doctrines, whichthen carried over to other, non-military contexts.  However, the vigor with which theseexceptionalist doctrines are applied is today somewhat less when the strongest claims andprerogatives of sovereignty are not threatened– outside the military procurement context. In 1865, in its very first Term and in the first volume of its official reporter, the newlyestablished United States Court of Claims decided Deming v. United States,127 and Jones v.United States,128 the pair of seminal cases.  Note the date, at the end of the United States’ Civil
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130 The enactment of the Legal Tender Act was made necessary by the exigencies and theexpenses of the Civil War.  See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, ___ (1870).
131Deming, 1 Ct. Cl. at 190.
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War. The first of these cases, Deming, arose from a series of contracts to provide rations for theMarine Corps during the first few years of the Civil War.  The contractor made a claim in thenewly available Court of Claims asserting that the government had breached these contracts,initially by imposing certain tariff duties on imports that increased the price to the contractor ofacquiring the rations the contractor was obligated to provide.  An additional breach was claimedto result from the enactment of the Legal Tender Act of 1862,129 which provided for the issuanceof paper United States currency that was valid for the payment of obligations though not backedby a reserve of gold.130  The contractor asserted that this second legislative act likewise had theeffect of increasing its cost of performing its contractual obligations.   The Court of Claimsrejected the contractor’s assertion that “by these enactments the United States have changed, andin effect imposed new conditions upon the peformance of their contracts.”131  Because thegovernment was engaged in “exercising its sovereign power of providing laws for the welfare ofthe State,” and because “[t]he statute[s] “bear[] upon [the government’s contract] as [they] bearsupon all similar contracts between citizens, and affect[s] it in no other way,” the enactment of thestatutes could not be considered a breach of the government’s contractual undertaking.132The court’s explanation of its holding is laconic to a fault, and no clear indication is given
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as to the reach of the principle that is invoked, leaving many important questions unresolved forfuture cases.133  Accordingly, although the particular contract involved in this seminal case was amilitary procurement contract, it is impossible to discern with any certainty whether that wasimportant to the outcome reached.  What is unmistakably clear is the court’s utter confidence that“general enactments of Congress” are not to be “construed as evasions of [a] particularcontract.”134  And it seems fair to report that, in this terse opinion,  marginally greater emphasis islaid upon the threat that the claim presents to the “sovereign right of enacting laws,” than on anyother factor.135   In other words, the contractor’s claim that its contract had indirectly beenviolated threatened to trench upon a core exercise of sovereign authority: the legislative power ofCongress.  Surely this warranted the exceptionalist doctrine that resulted.  Yet the fact remainsthat Deming was a case of military procurement, which spawned what became a far-reachingassertion of exceptional prerogatives for the government.  Deming’s defense of a “sovereign rightof enacting laws” that cannot be forfeited  by the conduct of the government’s contracting  isassuredly  a defense of the key prerogatives of sovereignty.136  But the court’s conclusion that the“United States as contractor are not responsible for the United States as lawgiver” simultaneouslyserves to vindicate the importance of the contracting function.137  
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The underlying message of Deming, the seminal case, thus is that enforceable governmentprocurement contracts and the integrity of sovereign power must be made to co-exist, becauseboth are of first-rank importance.  They are made to co-exist by a doctrine that stronglydiscourages interpretation of a government procurement contract as promising that governmentcontracts will not be adversely affected by the enactment of intervening generically applicablestatutes.  The extent to which Deming served as a vindication of the government’s contractingfunction is most apparent if one considers the probable consequences that would have followedhad the court reached the opposite decision in Deming and similar cases.  Failure to embrace thesovereign acts doctrine principle invented in Deming would have presented the government witha dilemma.  The government could risk being significantly restricted in its regulatory andlegislative authority once it had entered into a web of contracts that could not (withoutcontractual liability) be burdened or impaired by such general legislation.  Alternatively, thegovernment would have to forego the substantial benefits of being able to secure goods andservices available through the market.  It is plain, at least from our vantage point of hindsight,that neither option would have been tolerable.   Moreover, although no single case can suffice toprove this point, it is suggested that the importance of reconciling the government contractingfunction with the exercise of its sovereign regulatory powers gained much of its plausibility andappeal, from the outset, from the military subject matter of the contracts involved in Deming. Moreover, the strong association between the government procurement function and the militarycontext was inescapable giving the timing of the contracts and the litigation over them, in thetime of the Civil War.  The performance of military procurement contracts such as those at issue
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in Deming was both innately important, and inherently susceptible of running afoul of theenactment of such generic legislation as the tariff and currency statutes that gave rise to theclaims in that case.If Deming suggests that assertion of sovereign prerogatives is supported by, but notlimited to the military procurement context,  Jones, the successor case, more clearly demonstratesthe impact of military procurement and exigencies in fostering exceptionalism.  In Jones it wasnot the contracts that were military, technically, but the governmental “interference” thatallegedly burdened the contractor’s performance was caused by military operations and militarydecisions that the court was loathe to second guess.  The claim in Jones arose out of a contract towith the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to survey certain lands described in treaties between theUnited States and certain Indian nations.  Understood in historical context, this may, in fact, beproperly regarded as a contract closely tied to military operations.  More striking, however, is thatthe plaintiff’s claim was that their required contractual performance for the government had beenrendered more difficult and expensive by the actions of the government.  What actions?  Plaintiffclaimed that by withdrawing army troops from certain particular military posts in Indian country,in asserted violation of the treaties involved, the United States had rendered more difficult andexpensive the performance of its contractual undertaking.138  The Court of Claims respondedsharply to what it plainly took to be the plaintiff’s hubris, explaining: “Whatever acts thegovernment may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general,cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into
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which it enters with private persons.”139  The Court plainly sought to, and did, articulate a genericprinciple to shield the United State from claims of this kind, which would subordinatesovereignty to an inflated and unrealistic version of contractual undertakings, expressed andimplied.  Still it seems fair to conclude that the fact pattern impressed upon the court the need forsuch protection.  The Court surely would have considered the plaintiff’s invitation judicially toreview the decisions of the United States concerning stationing of troops and authorizing troopmovements, made in the course of the Indian Wars,  to be unthinkable.  Again the militarycontext made clear the importance of protecting sovereignty, generically.  But the militarycontext also made especially plain the inappropriateness of the sought-for exercise of judicialreview and the intrusive impact on government decision-making that would have resulted fromentertaining this claim.   The impact of military considerations, if not military procurement per se, on theacceptance of the exceptionalist principles of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine was underscoredfurther when the Supreme Court of the United States endorsed and indeed broadened theapplication of the sovereign acts doctrine in Horowitz v. United States.140  If Deming and Jones(like Corliss Steam-Engine Co.) were products of the Civil War and the Indian Wars, Horowitzwas an artifact of World War I and its aftermath.  A federal agency, the Ordnance Salvage Board,had in 1919 contracted to sell the plaintiff certain silk in the government’s possession thatevidently had become surplus, in the wake of the end of the war.  Although the agency
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contractually promised to ship the surplus silk with a day or two of receipt of the purchaser’sorder, it was unable to do so when the shipping instructions were received.  Timely performancewas blocked by an embargo on non-essential shipments imposed by another federal agency, theUnited States Railroad Administration.  The plaintiff sought damages for the loss that it incurredwhen shipping was thus delayed and it was unable to resell the silk at the high price prevailing atthe time of the order to ship the silk that had been dishonored by the government.141  Althoughthe decision went beyond the circumstances of Deming and Jones in that the government haddishonored its own promise, rather than simply burdening the exercise of the contractor’sundertakings, the Horowitz court simply invoked Deming and Jones as controlling.142  Althoughthe Court does not specifically cite any military necessity for the regulatory rail embargo, or forthe sale of surplus military property itself, the significance of the military context is suggested bythe facts.   As in Deming it appears a balanced conclusion to state here simply that recognition ofthe sovereign prerogative (to regulate use of the rails in the public or national interest) wasdramatically illustrated by the factual context.  Military procurement (or surplus equipment sales)served simply to illustrate effectively the importance of shielding the exercise of the sovereignauthority from restrictions implied from a government commercial undertaking.The sovereign act doctrine cases should be read to teach that the courts’ embrace of exceptionalist rules of government contracting was advanced by the context of militaryprocurement or surplus equipment sale.   And where entertaining a contractual claims would
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have entailed judicially reviewing the justification for a military decision, the court have beenparticularly forthcoming about protecting sovereign prerogatives against restraints on theexercise of sovereign authority that otherwise might be inferred from the operation of thegovernment’s contractual undertakings.   But the protection of sovereign authority surely was notlimited to the context of military procurement or interference through judicial review withmilitary decisionmaking. In recent years, as the Supreme Court arguably has cut back somewhat on the breadth orvigor of this exceptionalist shield for the exercise of government sovereignty.143   The author hasargued against any conclusion that Winstar or its progeny have significantly reduced the scope orvigor of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine and the related Unmistakability Doctrine.144  But even ifthat is adjuged otherwise, these cases arise in a civilian contexts and typically involve the use ofcontracts as a primary or a supplemental means of regulating private economic activity.145  It isplain that the courts deciding these cases did not perceive that important sovereign prerogativeswere at stake in these cases; the contexts were markedly different from the military procurementsettings, and related contexts in which sovereignty has been perceived as vitally threatened by thecourts.  Accordingly, the strength of exceptionalist policies may have waned when the strongimplications for sovereignty typically recognized in military procurement contexts – and in some
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148Id. at 1298-1299, 1300-1306.  Accord: Shoals American Industries, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 877 F.2d 883, 888-889 (11th Cir. 1989). 
other contexts in which strong contractual rights would have threatened key prerogatives ofsovereignty– were absent.
4. The deferential standard of review in judicial bid protests Another compelling illustration of the contribution of military procurement contexts toexceptionalism in the United States law of government contracts can be seen in the cases andstatutes that embody the deferential standard of review applicable to bid protest cases.  Thisdeferential standard was discussed above, in connection with the Steinthalcase, involving bidprotest jurisdiction in the United States District Courts.146  Steinthal itself arose out ofprocurement for parachutes by the Air Force.147  And the policies articulated by the court asreasons for the deferential standard of review reflect the very policy considerations that typicallydrive the exceptionalist doctrines noted in this Article: the technical nature of the procurementpolicy issues, the technical complexity of the relevant body of law, and the superior expertise ofprocurement officials and the General Accounting Office that all called for deference to theagency’s judgment.148  In subsequent years this deferential standard, was codified, and iscodification gave explicit recognition to the special need for extra deference in the militaryprocurement context.  The statutory standard of review for judicial bid protests now provides inpertinent part: “In exercising [bid protest] jurisdiction  under this subsection, the courts shall give
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due regard to the interests of national defense and national security and the need for expeditiousresolution of the action.”149 The dramatic impact of military procurement in shaping anexceptionalist body of law could not be more explicit.  Still, equally telling is the fact that thedeferential standard of review for judicial bid protest cases, as it was interpreted in Steinthal, amilitary procurement case, was carried over to civilian procurement, and was also codified, thusspreading the impact of the exceptionalism flowing from the military template for the UnitedStates’ procurement law regime.150
5. Other Examples of Military-Derived ExceptionalismPart II of this paper introduces a host of additional examples of exceptionalism that arefairly clearly traceable to the impact of military procurement.  Were space no object, each ofthese could be explored in detail.  But the examples explored more carefully above should beentirely sufficient to establish the theory advocated here: that the centrality of militaryprocurement in the development of the United States’ procurement law regime was a powerfulengine for the development of the exceptionalist approach so evident in that regime.  Still, it isappropriate briefly to list here other exceptionalist doctrines whose content and development appear to reflect the impact of military procurement:
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151See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  Note that Arrow Lacquer, cited there, arosefrom military procurement.  The facts of that case arguably suggest an abuse of discretion by thegovernment in a context in it appears at first blush that a non-material performance defect couldnot possibly have had any significance.  But performance disputes tribunals undoubtedly andunderstandably are loathe in the extreme ever to be put in the position of deciding whether aperformance failure in a military context is material.    
152See supra TAN 13 and authorities cited therein. The policies that underlie the broadtermination for convenience doctrine developed in the context of military procurement areequally applicable here.  See TAN notes 95-98 and accompanying notes.  Indeed, analytically, atermination for convenience is just an extreme unilateral change; and a partial termination forconvenience is indistinguishable from a change order.  Accordingly, it is not surprising that thepolicies that lie behind these two exceptionalist doctrines are essentially identical. Corliss Steam-Engine Co. explains precisely why military procurement contracts are especially likely to giverise to change orders.  See supra TAN 96.
153See supra TAN 56-57.  The need for criteria other than lowest price to judge whichoffer affords best value to the government is most readily apparent in cases of militaryprocurement.  Presumably no one wants our government to be forced to buy the cheapest fighterplane as opposed to the fastest, most maneuverable, or stealthiest plane.
• the doctrine of strict compliance; 151• the government’s right to terminate for default where no performance deadline has yetbeen missed, simply because ultimate performance has been endangered; • the broad authority of federal government contracting officers to impose unilateral changeorders that substantial increase, reduce or alter the contractor’s obligations ofperformance under a federal government contract; 152• the development of competitive negotiation procedures as an alternative to sealed biddingas a means of securing full and open competition, the importance of which is mostevident in military procurement settings; 153 and • the development of cost-reimbursement contracting as an alternative to firm-fixed pricecontracts because the need to shift the risk of uncertainty as to the cost of performance to
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the government is greatest in connection with contracts for cutting edge performances thatpush the envelope of available technology.154
We close with one final example of exceptionalism that is explicitly and clearly tied tothe context of military procurement: the “government contractor defense” recognized in Boyle v.United TechnologiesCorp.155  As indicated above, the emergence of that exceptionalist doctrineis explicitly tied by the Court to the considerations applicable to its military procurementcontext.156
IV. Conclusions, Recommendations for Further Study and Policy PrescriptionsThis Article has undertaken to define more rigorously the phenomenon of exceptionalismin public procurement law, and to study the incidence of this phenomenon in the federalgovernment contracts law of the United States.  It has also sought an explanation for the strongexceptionalist tendency found in United States public contract law, particularly in the law ofgovernment contract performance.  It has also examined the prominent role – especiallynoteworthy when viewed through the lens of comparative public procurement law – that militaryprocurement has played in the development of the legal regime for public procurement in theUnited States.   And it has tested the explanation that including military procurement at the
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center of the public procurement system in the United States has been a major cause of theemergence of this exceptionalist character in the government contracts law of the United States. Although the reader will have to draw her own conclusions as to the strength of the evidencemarshaled here, the two basic theses of this Article were supported by the historical and doctrinalsurvey and analysis that is offered here. First, the incidence of exceptionalism is dramatically skewed when United States publicprocurement law is viewed as a whole; it is highly concentrated in the doctrines that governpublic contract performance and associated disputes.  United States law of public contractformation is, instead, mostly a blend of 1) reverse exceptionalism that imposes special duties onfederal agencies engaged in procurement that exceed any counterpart doctrines applicable toprivate parties purchasing goods or services in the commercial marketplace, and 2) significantelements of congruence, as to which the requirements of public contract formation parallel orapproximate those borne by private contracting parties.157  Although there are certainlysignificant exceptionalist doctrines that affect federal government contract formation, and yetothers that affect both formation and performance, or which transcend these categories, the mainthrust of exceptionalism is concentrated in the law of public contract performance in the UnitedStates.  This pattern that describes the incidence of exceptionalism in United States publiccontract law has particular significance for comparative law purposes.  The law of governmentcontract performance is not treated as a co-equal part of the public procurement law, along with
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the law of government contract formation, in many other nations, including significant Europeanprocurement law regimes.  Accordingly, recognizing the concentration of exceptionalism in the United States’ law of public contract performance, and the divergence of this body of law fromthe norms of other countries is an essential precondition to accomplishing meaningful andilluminating comparative law analysis in the field of public procurement law.Second, the evidence appears to support the conclusion that the central role played bymilitary procurement in the development of the United States public procurement regime is aprimary explanation for the strongly exceptionalist character that has emerged in that system. Many of the key exceptionalist doctrines emerged in cases involving military procurement.  Andthe rationales given for the exceptionalist approaches taken generally confirm that the militarycontext significantly influenced the exceptionalist doctrines that emerged in these cases.  Among the significant policies factors that have contributed to the exceptionalistcharacter of this body of law is the unusual susceptibility of military procurement contracts tounforeseen circumstances because of the shifting fortunes and inherent unpredictabiliy of war.  Asecond recurring factor is the susceptibility of military procurement contracts to unforeseenchanges because of the technological sophistication and progressiveness of the goods andservices subject to procurement.  It is striking that this feature of military procurement wasrecognized, quite early on in United States history, in Corliss Steam-Engine Co., the seminal caseon the termination for convenience power of federal agencies engaged in procurement, whicharose from the termination of contracts caused by the end of the Civil War.  A third factor of verysubstantial consequence is the highly understandable but nonetheless striking reluctance of
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federal courts closely to review the decisions of military officials as to the military necessity forparticular goods or services or changes in the specifications or contract modifications orterminations.  These factors are displayed recurrently in the leading procurement cases, and plainlyprovide a major explanation for the exceptionalist approach taken to military procurement in theUnited States.  Moreover, because military procurement served as a template for the developmentof the entire system of public procurement law in the United States, the exceptionalist model andaccompanying policies that were developed and initially justified for military purposes have nowbeen carried over, to a very substantial degree, though not fully,  into the law regulating civiliancontracts of the United States.  Indeed, in most instances and in most respects, this is a singleunified body of law today.  What this pattern most strongly suggests is that early in the political and legal history ofthe United States, and early in the development of the United States public procurement lawregime, the compelling nature of the sovereign prerogatives of government was first and mostthoroughly recognized in the context of disputes arising out of military procurement.  Althoughthis recognition has not carried over with undiminished force to the civilian context, militaryprocurement has served, to a significant degree, as a Trojan horse, that opened the procurementlaw regime to exceptionalist doctrines that accommodate the special needs and responsibilitiesborne by the government, even when it enters into the procurement market place.This causal explanation proposed here is further corroborated by examining instances inwhich congruence has played a more prominent role in United States public procurement law. 
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Such cases are characteristically ones in which the compelling policy justifications forexceptionalist approaches that have been recognized in cases involving military procurementwere simply lacking because of the absence of a military context for the procurement.  As PurcellEnvelope demonstrates, this differential approach is of long standing.  On the other hand, asnoted above, because military procurement-based doctrines have now crossed over to apply innon-military procurement settings, and a largely unified body of procurement law has beenfostered by federal statutes and regulations, the disparity has disappeared in many contexts.  Nonetheless, it may not be entirely gone.  For instance, the Supreme Court has in recent yearsshifted to a somewhat more congruence-oriented posture regarding federal government contracts,especially with respect to the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines.158  The civilian andregulatory context of the contracts involved in such cases is markedly different than that of thecases that produced these paradigmatic exceptionalist doctrines and that disparity in contextlikely explains the Court’s recent drift in the direction of congruence in these cases.  Moreover,because of the unification of regulation of federal public contracts in the post-World War II era,there is a risk that this more congruence-oriented approach will be carried over, inappropriatelyperhaps, to contexts in which sovereign prerogatives deserve more protection and demandexceptionalist treatment.  These may in fact include military procurement cases.  On the otherhand, although it is far too soon to render any firm judgments on these matters, the terroristattacks on the United States of 9/11/2001, as well as the Iraq War and ensuing occupation of2003-2004, have created opportunities to re-dramatize the important prerogatives of sovereignty
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159 As noted above, note ___, this study does not examine the body of state (or local)public procurement law that is in force in the various States of the United States.  Because stateand local governments do not have military functions, an extension of the exceptionalism andcongruence constructs to the study of state and local public procurement law in the United Statesalso has potential to shed additional light on the strength of the argument made here concerningthe impact of military procurement on the exceptionalist character of United States publicprocurement law.  Such additional study would necessarily be time consuming because of the formalindependence of each of the States’ public procurement regimes and the possible diversity ofpractices among the states in this regard.  But such additional study would be particularlyvaluable as it would help to ferret out the presence, or absence, of other factors unique to theUnited States legal context, that might explain divergence of United States federal public
that are implicated by public contracting.  Although this is largely a subject for another article,contract disputes and procurement policy controversies emerging from the Iraq War andsubsequent occupation have highlighted both the grounds for, and the potential abuses associatedwith, exceptionalism in the law of federal public contracting.This Article has also identified important opportunities for further research in acomparative law vein, designed to explore further and test in other contexts the theses presentedhere.  Of particular importance would be studies that employ the constructs of exceptionalismand congruence employed here  to explore the development of public procurement law in avariety of other nations, including developing nations, and those with transitional economiesemerging from a legacy of socialism that are developing or seeking to develop competitive,transparent public procurement law regimes.   Such comparative law work would also offer animportant opportunity to test the second thesis of this Article: that the military procurementtemplate that was the basis for much of the development of the United States public procurementlaw regime has been a primary cause of the strong exceptionalist strain in the public procurementlaw of the United States.159
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contract law from tendencies that are dominant elsewhere in the world.  If state and local public procurement law in the United States generally lacks theexceptionalist character of  federal public procurement law, that would provide additionalevidence to support the argument made here.  On the other hand, if it were to emerge that stateand local public procurement law in the United States tends to share fully the exceptionalistcharacter of the federal model, the question that would then have to be addressed is whether thissimilarity reflects a) the influence of the federal model on development of state and localprocurement law in the United States, or b) the presence of other factors (not addressed in thisstudy) in the United States legal environment that predispose United States public procurementlaw systems to the exceptionalist approach.
160 Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1, passim; Schwartz, AssemblingWinstar, supra note 1, passim; Schwartz, Wake of Winstar, supra note 1, passim.
Finally, the argument advanced here has important implications for public policyregarding the design of public procurement regimes world wide.  In particular, it has lessons fordeveloping nations and transitional economies first seeking to develop an open, competitive, andtransparent public procurement law system.  The author has sought, in previous work, as well asin this Article above, to identify the important advantages that exceptionalist doctrines of publicprocurement law, especially in the law of government contract performance, confer on a nationand its procurement system.160  The responsibilities and duties of the sovereign indeed compel usto devise a body of public contract law that balances the special needs of the government with theprotection of the expectations and interests of government contractors.  Because the militaryprocurement context has served to highlight these considerations, as it served as the template forthe development of the procurement regime in the United States, it cast that system in anexceptionalist mold.   The author concludes that the impact on the development of theprocurement law regime in the United States has been a beneficial one, fostering doctrines thatengendered a desirable and appropriate flexibility for the sovereign engaged in procurement,
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while finding appropriate devices to protect the key interests of government contractors andwould-be contractors.  Military procurement has performed this important catalytic role in the development ofexceptionalist public procurement law doctrine in the United States.  Nonetheless, concernsabout security, flexibility, and nationalistic/protectionist interests have discouraged many nationsdeveloping their own procurement law regimes in recent times from regulating military andsecurity-related public procurement under the umbrella of an open, competitive and transparentprocurement law regime.  The same is true of the major international instruments that attempt toestablish  regional or world open public procurement markets, such as the European Uniontreaties and Directives and the Government Procurement Agreement of the World TradeOrganization.  Nevertheless, if military procurement played so important a role in catalyzing theemergence of an appropriately exceptionalist public procurement law regime in the UnitedStates, as is claimed here, there may be substantial adverse consequences when militaryprocurement is not engrossed emerging national and international public procurement regulatoryregimes.   In light of the findings of this Article, these hidden spillover costs of excluding mostmilitary procurement from the reach of developing and established public procurement regulatoryregimes should no longer be overlooked.   The widespread acceptance of such commonly-accepted exclusions should be reconsidered. 
